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EDITORIAL

THE death of the Bishop of Winchester removes from our midst a Bishop of great heart, deep pastoral sympathy, wide vision, and fervent faith. What he was to his own people, and to those who, like the present writer, were brought into close touch with him, has been truly and beautifully described by the Rev. F. A. Iremonger, writing in *The Guardian* of March 11. He shared, further, with the late Archbishop Davidson, an almost uncanny gift for saying the right word, and using the apt illustration, on any occasion. It was this that made him so acceptable an ambassador of the Church of England in many matters of moment, both at home and abroad.

Father Herbert's article published below seems to us to set out in an admirable way the reasons which make it requisite that Intercommunion should follow, and not precede, Reunion. As he rightly points out, the Church of England is surrounded by a non-churchly type of religion which is very far removed from the Christianity of the New Testament. To what lengths this type of religion will go—we might indeed say, to what depths it will sink—is abundantly illustrated in American Protestantism; and it would be disastrous for the Church of England to weaken any safeguards we have against dangers of that kind. For this reason we think that the Bishops' Convocation Resolutions went in certain respects too far: and we hope that, before the concurrence of the Lower Houses is asked, they will be so modified as to apply only to exceptional cases and cases of necessity. It must be remembered that the dangers of a drift in a non-churchly direction are by no means confined to Nonconformity. Our Prayer Book and Articles make it quite clear to any honest and candid mind that the Church of England stands for something quite different from undenominationalism: but there is none the less a constant advocacy of laxity within the borders of Anglicanism. And nothing makes a liberal policy more difficult than such laxity.

INTERCOMMUNION AND REUNION

THIS much is clear: that the dislike felt by Anglicans towards Intercommunion is totally unintelligible to the majority of Free Churchmen. The Convocations last January had before them proposals for the admission of Free Churchmen under certain circumstances to Communion at the altars of the Church; in the next issue of the *British Weekly*, one writer after another alluded to the subject with amazement that we should feel any difficulty over the matter. This article was, however, not written originally in view of the Convocation proposals; it arose out of a more general discussion with some friends in the Student Movement, and was addressed to them as an *apologia*.

We do not usually succeed in explaining ourselves. Often we take our stand on reasons which, seen from the other side, are weak or plainly invalid. It is not sufficient merely to quote the rubric about Confirmation; and when we say that our real reasons lie deeper, and take refuge in mystery, we probably seem merely provoking, while if we make claims for the Church we probably seem to be guilty of spiritual snobbery. Yet our real reasons do lie deeper; we do believe in the Church as a sacred mystery, as God's new creation—not in the Church as merely a serviceable form of organization, nor, again, in the Church as it actually is, but in what we believe to be God's meaning for the Church. We believe in a spiritual reality underlying the forms of Church organization, a spiritual reality which the actual Church expresses very unworthily; it is just for this reason that we long for the Reunion of Christendom.

When we say in the Creed that we believe in the Holy Catholic Church, this statement follows immediately on our confession of faith in the threefold Name, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. That is to say, faith in the Church is placed in direct relation to faith in the Gospel of God's redemption. This is fundamental: all depends on this, that God really has come to mankind in Christ, with His gift of salvation. But this is not merely a message of salvation to each individual separately; we mean that God has established on earth an Order, or Dispensation, or Covenant, and that of this Covenant the visible Church is the actual expression and embodiment. We assert this of the actual Church, in spite of her manifold and grievous failings, her divisions, her worldliness, her weakness, her unworthiness of so glorious a vocation. It is only because we believe in her Divine calling that we are so troubled by her imperfections. Yet the actual imperfections of the Church do not raise any fresh difficulty

of theological principle; for the Church must always be imperfect, since she is composed of sinful men in process of sanctification. In spite of all imperfections and sins, she retains the marks of her Divine calling as God's new creation, and it is these which make her God's Church. She bears in her very nature and structure the character of a "spiritual society." The phrase is that of F. D. Maurice, who in the central section of "The Kingdom of Christ"* gives what may truly be called the classical exposition of the idea which I am setting forth.

Maurice sets out in order the "Signs of a Spiritual Constitution"; and first he places Baptism. By it we are made members of the Church; in the New Testament it is the symbol and means of the transition from the old life to the new. It witnesses directly to the Gospel of God—to God's free act of grace by which He makes this person His child, and declares that He has a meaning for his life. It witnesses to the universality of this Divine calling: We who were baptized did put on Christ; there can be neither Jew nor Greek, bond nor free, male nor female, for ye are all one man in Christ Jesus (Gal. iii. 27 f.). This is a paradox, for obviously these differences still remain; but they are reconciled, the enmity being taken away, in the new fellowship which God has created for mankind through Christ; and this fellowship is the Church.

The same two principles, of God's redeeming work and man's fellowship through Christ, are seen in the Eucharist. Here is celebrated God's own redemptive act, the Sacrifice of Christ: "Ye do show the Lord's death till He come." The eucharistic rite is the summing-up of all the Messiah came to do; His Blood of the Covenant, *novi et æterni testamenti*, is the basis of the Dispensation of Grace. And as Christ, the Head of the Body, has made His perfect self-oblation, so when the members of His body are united with Him in communion, they too are offered up to be a reasonable, holy and living sacrifice (Ephes. v. 2). Thereby, in being united with Him, they are united with one another; and this applies not merely to "this congregation here present," but to the whole fellowship of the redeemed, of all races and of all generations, in this world and in the next. The Eucharist therefore belongs to the Church, and to the whole Church; every Eucharist is a Eucharist of the whole Church; and the Eucharist can never be a service merely of private devotion, nor merely the centre of unity of a congregation or a denomination. It witnesses to the universality of the Spiritual Society.

This brings us to the Ministry; it too witnesses to the same two principles, the reality of the Redemption and its universality. As Christ is the Shepherd of the Flock, so are His minis-

* Vol. i., pp. 260 to end; vol. ii., pp. 1-171, in Dent's Everyman Edition.

ters pastors, not in their own name, but in His; they are sent to feed His sheep. Just in the same way, as Christ is the One Priest, so His ministers are priests; not vicariously, as though they were His deputies in His absence, but representatively, as ministering to and for His people in His Name; not as His successors in priesthood now that He is gone, but as witnesses to the reality of His present priesthood, and organs through which that priesthood is exercised. For this reason the right to celebrate the Eucharist is limited to those properly commissioned by the Church; the Eucharist belongs to the whole Church, and no one can take on himself the right to celebrate it. Here too we find the meaning of Apostolical Succession; the ministry committed to each new minister is continuous with the Christian ministry from the beginning, and connects with the historical Incarnation. Hence, though Apostolical Succession commonly seems to Free Churchmen to be a principle of exclusiveness and division, in reality and essentially it is a principle of universality, a symbol of the unity of the whole Body of Christ, and a witness against exclusiveness and sectarianism. The remedy for the present anomaly is not that Apostolical Succession should be discarded, but that through Reunion it should be manifested again as a principle of universality.

This witness of the Christian ministry to the unity of men in Christ is far from being a fanciful idea out of relation to real life. In South Africa, torn by racial cleavage, a Bishop is the spiritual father of white and black alike, honoured and revered by both. His influence will be marred in so far as he is forgetful of the meaning of his office; but it depends essentially, not on his personal qualities as a Christian man, but on his office as the personal representative of the fellowship which God has created for mankind in His Church. It is required in stewards that a man be found faithful.

The same principles are seen in the other "signs of a Spiritual Constitution" which Maurice gives: the Creeds, the Scriptures, and the Forms of common worship. The Creed is a universal form, expressing personal confession of the Three-fold Name in which we are redeemed. The Scriptures are the record of the looking forward to the Messiah in the Old Covenant, and of the Apostolic witness to the fact of His coming; it is this, and not the quality of the ideas about God which they set forth, that gives the real uniqueness of the Scriptures. Forms of common prayer testify to the commonness and universality of man's need and God's answer.

These points, here set forth in barest outline, deal with matters which we Churchmen regard as altogether essential to Christianity. For Christianity is not in the first place God's self-reve-

lation to the individual Christian or his experience of God; it is concerned primarily not with the question "What is God like?" but with the question "What has God done?" God in Christ has reconciled the world to Himself; on the basis of this reconciling act He has established a real Order, Dispensation, or Covenant, which is embodied in the Church.

Two corollaries follow. First, Intercommunion without Reunion is really meaningless; for Holy Communion, as the Sacrament of the fellowship of the Body, does not stand by itself, but implies the whole organic life of the Body. "We being many are one Bread, one Body; for we all partake of the one Bread." The Intercommunion now being established with the Old Catholics is Reunion; but the suggested occasional Intercommunion of Free Churchmen at our altars is not Reunion. The principle of "Economy," as understood by the Eastern Church, may be used to cover occasional and particular exceptions, but not a general permission for a relaxation of the principle under circumstances which will regularly recur.

The second point is of very great importance, but is not at all easy to state. The Sacraments are God's Sacraments; therefore we have to be very careful how we appeal to them in order to prove that we are right and others are wrong. Since they are God's Sacraments, we may easily find them witnessing against us. As His Sacraments, they are Catholic, universal, given in order to be the centre of unity for all His children. Therefore, just because we believe in them, we are bound to feel it to be a terrible anomaly that we are not united in the fellowship of the Church with all believing Christians. No one can be a true Christian without being a missionary at heart; and no one can truly believe in the reality of the sacramental fellowship which God has made for man, without seeking with all his power to heal the schisms which exist between Christians.

We need therefore to fear lest we sin in this matter. Episcopacy is, we believe, a Divine institution; but it is very evident that we and our forefathers have failed very grievously in our presentation of Episcopacy; Prelacy, for instance, is a grievous denial of the principles which Episcopacy exists to set forth. The same principle applies all through. And we can fall into exactly the same sin in relation to the question of Intercommunion if we base our argument on our rights of Church membership, regarded as our privilege, and use these rights as a principle of exclusion in order to show that others have not these rights. Comments might be made from this point of view on the Report of the Theological Committee of the E.C.U., which was prepared in view of the January meeting of Convocation. The refusal to admit Intercommunion was necessary and right, as we have

seen, and some valuable material on the subject was collected; but the main argument was wholly based on principles of Church Law, and almost no attempt was made to set forth the Christian and evangelical principles underlying the Sacrament and its administration. It is well to remember that Tertullian, having defended Catholic principles on sectarian lines, ended by becoming a sectarian himself. But we must return to this point at the end of this paper.

We have been thinking of the sacramental system as a Church system; but it is evident that the positive sacramental beliefs of Churchmen are shared to a large extent by Nonconformists. There is indeed a certain truth in the generalization that Catholic Christians stand for belief in the Church and Sacraments, and Protestants for freedom and the approach of the individual to God. But, on the other hand, the Protestant Churches are all institutional systems; and the original Protestantism was not merely a revolt against formalism in the name of freedom, but also an endeavour to reconstitute the order of the Church and Sacraments in a way that seemed to be more in accord with the Gospel. And it is certainly true that the practical problem of Reunion consists very largely in the adjustment of rival institutional systems, all of which are now some centuries old and highly organized.

If this were the whole difficulty, the problem of Reunion would be difficult but not insoluble. If it were possible to assume as the undisputed basis of discussion that Christianity is the Gospel of God's Redemption, in the New Testament sense, the problem would be mainly one of Order, not of Faith; the evil to be dealt with would be schism rather than heresy. It is for this reason that the scheme for the United Church of South India has fair hope of success; for they are all missionaries, and only the Gospel of God can make missionaries. But actually the matter is immensely complicated by the coming-in of another factor—the idealistic, humanistic theology, which finds a typical expression in Ritschlianism, and is essentially a different faith from that of the old Gospel.

This re-interpretation of Christianity is in the air everywhere in these days; its teaching is familiar to us all. The Bible is interpreted in an evolutionary sense, as the record, not of God's Covenant with man, but of the attainment by man of progressively higher ideas about God: our Lord, as the great Teacher and Example, and Son of God in the sense that the highest human most fully reveals the Divine: the Kingdom of God, not as something which *comes* by God's act, in the old eschatological sense, but as an order of righteousness realized on earth in the course of human progress. The real issue here is not that of

freedom of critical enquiry *versus* traditionalism: for the spirit of inquiry is essentially Christian, and here Liberal Protestant scholars have done an immense amount of work of permanent value: it is that the re-interpretations offered represent a completely different religious outlook from that of the old Christianity.

Wherever such views are held, it is clear that there will be much impatience with traditional doctrinal formulæ, and an effort to claim freedom from "bondage" to them, and to interpret them in a new sense. Rashdall thus re-interprets the idea of Redemption and Atonement in terms of man's repentance and amendment. "The weakness of this exposition is that the forgiving and atoning work of God is *made dependent* upon the ethical effects in human lives; consequently, the Divine Love is not clearly set forth as a free, spontaneous love."* Similarly, the idea of sacrifice in the New Testament is not explained as representing a mighty spiritual reality, but as a stage in religion which has now been left behind.†

Where such views are held, there will also be a weakening of respect for the old forms of Church organization. They will be tolerated as survivals, but there will be a constant effort to over-leap the old barriers, and to reorganize the Churches in the service of the onward march of humanity towards the realization of the ideals of brotherhood and universal peace. For this religion is essentially humanitarian, anthropocentric; not, like the Gospel, theocentric. The Eucharist therefore can no longer be seriously treated as of Divine institution, or as the Memorial of God's Covenant; it is rather a symbol of discipleship, of following Christ in the way of self-sacrifice, and of the fellowship of man with man.

From this point of view there cannot be a moment's doubt about Intercommunion. The refusal of it is meaningless, a mere survival of a dead traditionalism. There is no more to be said.

The connection between this New Theology and Intercommunion is not always clearly perceived by Anglo-Catholics, but it is there at the back of our minds as a fear or distrust. It is certain that no discussion of Intercommunion can be fruitful if it does not take fully into account the influence of this New Theology.

It is true that there has been a strong reaction against this theological tendency in recent years on the Continent. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, Ritschlian Liberalism was

* Aulén, *Christus Victor*, p. 156.

† Cf. a review of Bishop Hicks, *The Fullness of Sacrifice*, in the *Modern Churchman*, March, 1931.

the dominant influence in most Protestant Churches; but it has suffered heavily from the attacks of the scholars of the History of Religions and the eschatological interpretation of the Gospels, and in these last years from the doctrinal re-statement of the Dialectical Theology of Barth and Brunner; the newer school of Swedish theology is moving on partly similar lines, but gives a much more balanced statement. In the Church of England, however, this New Theology is still strongly in evidence; and as the Church system is rigid and difficult to reform, it has formed a party. In the Free Churches, which are less closely bound to doctrinal and liturgical formulæ, it is present more widely as a subtle influence whose limits are hard to fix.

Now I have no intention of suggesting that Free Church teaching as a whole is Ritschlian or Modernist. I have emphasized the close connection between Modernism and the Intercommunion proposal; but I do not mean that all who advocate Intercommunion are really Modernist in tendency. Far from it. But I am faced with the problem why my own Free Church friends, who believe in the Gospel of Redemption, and whose teaching belongs to the orthodox Christian tradition, take an attitude towards Intercommunion different from ours.

So far as I understand, Intercommunion seems to them the natural course for Christians to take. I think they would agree with me in saying that their difference from Anglo-Catholics is, that while we regard the matter from the side of Church Order, they look at it more from the point of view of the individual. They have not grown up in a rigid sacramental system; they do not think of the Sacraments in the way outlined above as "signs of a spiritual society"; they take the mark of a true Church to be its vitality and its Christian spirit.

Surely it is just at this point that we most need to understand one another. Is it not possible that just at this point we Anglicans have our real contribution to make in the conception of the outward forms of dogma and order—the Scriptures, Creeds, Ministry, Sacraments—as the vehicles and preservatives of the Christian Gospel?

If I may speak quite freely, it seems to us that there has been in the Free Churches for a long time past a movement away from the old strictness in matters both of faith and order. The standard of orthodoxy is much laxer; and in matters of order there has been a very great change since the days when the Non-conformists complained of the Church of England because the Communion was open to all the parish:* even Presbyterians have to a large extent lost their traditional strictness in the "fencing of the tables." The chief exception seems to be the

* *The Evangelical Doctrine of Holy Communion*, ed. Macdonald, p. 282.

Baptist Church, which has always retained a strong denominational sense; and it is very interesting indeed to us Anglicans when we find Baptist voices raised to protest against the proposals for Intercommunion, saying that they have no mind to be admitted to the Anglican Communion as "poor relations"; and a correspondent in the *British Weekly* (Feb. 5, 1932) insists that they came out from the Church of England originally because they regarded that Church as heretical, and they are by no means sufficiently satisfied with us yet to desire Intercommunion with us.

Quite frankly, we regard this denominational spirit as in itself sound and healthy, and we wish there were more of it. We think that the Free Churches have got to choose which way they will go: whether they will follow the drift towards greater laxity in faith and order and end in a definitely humanitarian religion, or whether they will retain and strengthen their hold on the old Gospel of Redemption. And it seems clear to us that Intercommunion without Reunion can only mean a definite step in the direction of a humanitarian religion; for such a Communion would not be the Sacrament of the unity of the Church, Christ's Body. It could only be a symbol of our fellowship in the pursuit of a religious and ethical ideal. That ideal might be given the name of discipleship to Christ our common Master and Lord; but it would not be, apart from Reunion, the true and full fellowship in Him which we can only have in the unity of His Church.

All this applies in full measure to the Student Movement. The S.C.M. is inter-denominational, and it has been consistently faithful to the inter-denominational principle. It has done wonders in bringing together Christians of different denominations and different races, and helping them to understand one another and express to one another their disagreements with the fullest Christian sincerity and Christian love. Truly this is the Lord's doing, and it is marvellous in our eyes. It bears the stamp of the real Christian unity of which St. Paul speaks, the unity in which differences are reconciled and the enmity is taken away. It is scarcely too much to say that all the hope that exists to-day of a real Reunion of English Christianity is due directly or indirectly to the S.C.M. Surely, now, this fellowship of the S.C.M. is so real and so Christian that it needs as its basis full Christian Reunion—nothing less, and not any substitute; the Communion of the Church of God, enriched by the contributions which its divided portions have to bring.

We have been asking big questions. And what is the answer? Apparently, that there is nothing to be done. But that is the one answer which is utterly impossible; it is unbelief, it is

denial of God's power. As well might we reply to the missionary call, that the task is beyond our power; and so of course it is. But there is a word of our Lord about saying to this mountain, Be thou removed, and be thou cast into the sea. Nothing is impossible if it be God's will.

Charity begins at home, and I am an Anglo-Catholic. We Anglo-Catholics ought to be doing very much more to make ourselves intelligible. If we believe what we profess, we ought to be doing all that is in our power to make our Churchmanship understood by Christians who are separated from us, above all by showing that it is really the Gospel of God's redemption that gives to our sacramental practice all its meaning. Let us follow the examples of such Evangelicals as Stanton, Dolling, and Bishop Weston. And this, of course, is the true Catholicism; for there is no true Catholicism that is not truly Evangelical. But of late we have been getting into a bad tradition, according to which the best Catholic is he who does things as differently as possible from the customary English ways, and follows a foreign standard of "correctness." But if we seek one thing only, to interpret to those among whom we live the Gospel of our salvation, and if we do it as a matter of duty to God, because as believing Christians we are bound to be missionaries, there will assuredly be a response. To be exclusive for exclusiveness' sake is sectarianism; to be exclusive as a matter of duty, for the sake of a future Reunion, may very well be the true Catholicism.

And if we thus treasure our own heritage, for the sake of the contribution which God has given us to make to the coming Reunion, we must encourage others to do the same; to be proud of their own Churches' history, and treasure up the gifts which they have to bring to a reunited Christendom. For we are very blind if we do not see that we have very much to learn from them, as they from us.

A. G. HEBERT, S.S.M.

VICISSITUDES OF CATHOLICISM IN MODERN FRANCE—I

THE history of the Church in France is a subject of interest to all English Churchmen. It is there that most of us first see Roman Catholicism in action. If there is much that rightly attracts us in it, there is also much from which we should do well to take warning. Polemical French Catholicism is not altogether typical of the mentality of the Roman Church, but it shows what Roman doctrine fully extended may involve.

Moreover since the French are the most logical nation in Europe and prefer an unresolved conflict in political theory to a practical compromise, their history is the best place for studying problems in the abstract. And there is no problem to-day where clear thought is more necessary than in that of the relations of Church and State.

Modern France is by universal consent dated from the outbreak of the Revolution in 1789. Since then we can distinguish three main periods in the relations of Church and State. The first is that of the Revolution itself, beginning with a genuine and not unsympathetic attempt to reform the Church and ending in a general religious persecution. The second extends from the Napoleonic Concordat of 1802, which re-established the Church, to the *loi du 9 décembre* 1905, which again separated Church and State. The third consists of the last twenty-five years, in which the Church, though disestablished and reduced in material wealth, has on the whole been stronger and more respected than at any time during the preceding century.

The present article is concerned with the first of these periods, the interest of which lies chiefly in its exemplification of different motives and methods of religious persecution. The persecution is sometimes political and sometimes anti-religious in character; it is due sometimes to the central government, sometimes to the local authorities, and sometimes to the populace; it is directed sometimes against a refractory, sometimes against a tolerated, and sometimes against an established Church. Certain similarities with the situation in Tudor England or in contemporary Russia will suggest themselves to every reader.

The French Church on the eve of the Revolution has become a byword of corruption, licentiousness, and irreligion. Yet this is only true of a comparatively small circle of court clergy. The real scandal was that almost all the vast income of the Church belonged either to the religious orders or to these court prelates, while the ordinary parish clergy lived in great poverty with practically no chance of preferment. Consequently the lower clergy, who formed four-fifths of the First Estate, were by no means out of sympathy with the demands for reform. It was in fact their vote which won the first great issue of the Revolution and secured that the three Estates should sit as a single National Assembly. Again, when in the night session of August 4, 1789, the nobles renounced their feudal privileges, the clergy voted the redemption, and later the complete renunciation, of the tithe. But this, though it removed a long-standing grievance, did nothing to aid the financial situation of the country, which was the cause of the summoning of the States-General. A ready way seemed at hand, and it was decided that, provided a stipend

was guaranteed to the clergy, the State had a right to take over the property of the Church. A motion declaring that "the goods of the clergy are the property of the nation" was introduced, and passed on November 4 in the rather less definite form that "the goods of the clergy are at the disposal of the nation." Even this did not secure united opposition from the clergy, for the lower clergy stood to gain from an equalization of incomes.

But already a certain bias had become apparent among the lawyers, who were the chief element in the Third Estate: they were less anxious to relieve the financial situation than to destroy the corporate power of their old enemy the clergy. Moreover, though many of them were practising Catholics, they were traditionally Gallican and Jansenist in sympathy and now saw a chance of revenging themselves upon the dominant party in the Church. It was their desire to retain an established religion while destroying the clergy as an Estate of the realm which had led them to replace the property of the Church by an annual grant. It was the same desire which dictated the form of their next measure—the Civil Constitution of the Clergy.

The Civil Constitution (so called because it was intended to deal only with the "external" régime of the clergy, not with their hierarchical organization) was essentially, in modern phrase, an attempt at "rationalization" of the Church. Sinecures, such as abbacies *in commendam* and chapters, were abolished. Dioceses and parishes were reduced in number and made to correspond with the new civil delimitations of *départements* and communes. A scale of stipends was drawn up and provisions made against non-residence and other abuses. Patronage was abolished and appointments both of bishops and priests were to be made by election. After election a bishop might write to the Pope to inform him of the fact but not to seek canonical institution. The Civil Constitution thus had an anti-papal and a democratic tone, but even its most questionable provision—that election should be by the ordinary body of electors of the *département* or commune, so that all citizens whether Catholics or not had a right to vote—does not seem to have been due to hostility to religion but to a confusion between membership of Church and State, which was not perhaps altogether unnatural when they had been identified for so long.

The Civil Constitution was voted on July 12, 1790. The Pope hesitated long before condemning it, and though several bishops did so, their opposition was discounted as due to aristocratic opposition to all reform. Soon the question of its legitimacy was forced upon all ecclesiastics. The Civil Constitution had provided that all newly-elected bishops and *curés* should take

an oath "to be faithful to the nation, the law, and the king, and to maintain with all their power the Constitution decreed by the National Assembly and accepted by the king." In November this oath was imposed upon all those already in office. About three-fifths of the parish clergy took it, but only five bishops: the remainder were deprived of their benefices. At the beginning of 1791 elections were held to fill the vacancies, and it was not till the new bishops and clergy were installed that the Pope made a public pronouncement. In March he condemned the Civil Constitution, excommunicated those who had conformed to it, and recalled the Nuncio from Paris.

From the spring of 1791 therefore there were two rival Churches in France: the Constitutional Church—in its own eyes and in those of the law no new schismatic Church but the ancient Church of France reformed and purified of papal usurpations—and the Nonjuring Church in communion with the Pope. The ranks of the Constitutional clergy contained some who were genuinely anxious to reconcile religion and liberty, some who had simply taken the line of least resistance, and some who were half-hearted or insincere in their religious allegiance—the Constitutional Church was always open to the charge that many of its keenest supporters were men who were hostile to religion altogether. The Nonjuring Church, on the other hand, was rapidly becoming more devoted in its ministry, as its unworthy and aristocratic priests and bishops emigrated abroad; and it was supported by the peasants who formed the great bulk of practising Catholics in France.

The nonjuring clergy had, owing to their refusal to take the Constitutional Oath, been deprived of their benefices and were no longer the clergy of the established Church, but they were granted pensions by the State and were still able freely to exercise their ministry. They might not officiate in the parish churches, but they could do so in private houses or in convent chapels, and they were expressly allowed to rent such churches as were no longer required for parochial purposes. But already they were beginning to be popularly suspected, often unjustly, of hostility to the whole of the Revolution and of complicity in the royalist intrigues. Sporadic demonstrations against nonjurors occurred, and finally, on November 29, the Legislative Assembly decreed that all nonjuring priests should take the Civic Oath or be "deemed suspect of revolt against the law and of evil intent against the *patrie*": if disturbances resulted from the presence of a nonjuror in the neighbourhood he was to be imprisoned for two years. This Civic Oath was not the oath required by the Civil Constitution but the ordinary oath required of all functionaries. There was now no question of the

nonjurors becoming again the established clergy; it was simply a convenient, if illogical, way of testing the loyalty of a prominent body of men suspected of disaffection. The King refused his sanction to the decree, but it was nevertheless put into force in many parts of France.

In the course of 1792 these measures were made more stringent. After the outbreak of war in April the inevitable outcry against the "unpatriotic" arose, and its first victims were the nonjuring clergy. On May 27 it was decreed that on the demand of 20 citizens of a canton a nonjuring priest might be deported as a disturber of the public peace: if he remained behind after being ordered to go, or if he returned after leaving, he was liable to imprisonment up to 10 years. Again the King refused his assent, and again without effect. After the suspension of the monarchy in August, a new law, to replace those of November 29 and May 27, was passed (August 26), providing that any nonjuring priest who had not taken either the Constitutional Oath or the Oath of Liberty and Equality (which had now superseded the Civic Oath) was, even without denunciation, to leave the country within fourteen days: if he refused to go he was to be deported to Guiana, if he agreed but remained behind, or if he returned after leaving, he was to be imprisoned for ten years.

Meanwhile persecution was beginning in earnest. It is hard to disentangle motives or to assign responsibility, but it seems still to have been inspired by fear of royalist sympathisers rather than by hatred of religious ministers as such. Certainly it was due to local authorities and to popular outcry, not to the central government. As early as June, 1791, some nonjuring priests had been imprisoned at Brest, and with the subsequent laws such imprisonments had become common in most parts of France. Mob violence caused some to be put to death, and this culminated in the September Massacres. Many nonjuring priests fled the country and followed their bishops into exile; others remained in hiding, exercising their ministry as they could at the risk of their lives.

At the beginning of 1793 the execution of the King and its consequences—the formation of the First Coalition and the rising in the Vendée—led to still more rigorous measures. In February a reward of 100 francs was offered to anyone who should denounce a refractory priest; and on March 18 it was decreed that any nonjuror who had remained or returned after deportation was liable, not now to imprisonment, but to death within 24 hours. It was the first official use of the death penalty and, however harsh, cannot yet be properly described as religious persecution.

Anti-religious motives had no doubt existed in particular instances from the beginning, but they only became general in the autumn of 1793, when the Terror was at its height. Henceforward the Constitutional clergy, whose loyalty to the Revolution was unquestionable, suffered as much as the nonjurors. First the Government began to encourage the marriage of priests, guaranteeing their stipends to those who should marry and threatening penalties against any who should forbid or even dissuade them. Next they were forbidden to keep any registers other than those of the State or to make enquiries about those who came to them for the Sacraments: so that if a man desired to be married, they might not ask whether he was baptized or divorced or an ex-cleric. This idea that any citizen as such had a right to the ministrations of the Constitutional Church was perhaps implicit in the Civil Constitution, but it was too much for many of the clergy. Thus they found themselves in opposition to the law, and began, like the nonjurors, to be accused of *incivisme*. On October 21, 1793, it was decreed that, on the demand of six citizens, any priest might be deported, whether he were nonjuror or constitutional.

Three days later, the Revolutionary Calendar, which abolished the seven-day week in favour of 36 *décadis*, was adopted, and a fortnight after (November 6) it was decided that any commune might establish whatever religion it chose and prohibit others. Gobel, the Constitutional bishop of Paris, was inveigled into renouncing his orders and his religion, and the Convention decreed the secularization of Notre-Dame for the purpose of forming it into a national Temple of Reason. The Commune of Paris followed suit by secularizing all the other churches in the city. The movement spread rapidly, and soon "the worship of Reason" was established in almost every town church throughout France and in many country ones. But it only lasted a short while. Within a week the Commune of Paris was forced to declare that in secularizing the parish churches it had never intended to prevent citizens from renting churches to conduct their own worship, and the Convention passed a law (December 6) similarly limiting the competence of local bodies to prohibit private exercise of religion.

But this by no means put an end to the period of persecution. Political pretexts could still be used to cover hostility to religion. Many churches remained closed, and priests, nonjurors and constitutionals in about equal numbers, continued to suffer imprisonment or death. Moreover, under the influence of Robespierre, another attempt was made at a national civic religion by the dedication of the first day of each *décadi* to a different topic. An elaborate festival of the *Être Suprême*, the

first of these *décadis*, was celebrated in June 1794, with impressive ceremonies designed by the artist David. But it too failed of popularity, and none of the other days was kept. Even the fall of Robespierre in July did not immediately alter the situation, though execution was generally abandoned in favour of deportation. But public opinion was inclining more and more towards toleration, and in the course of 1795 various measures were passed decreeing the complete separation of Church and State.

The principle of separation, which lasted for seven years, was that neither the Republic nor the individual commune might establish or subsidize any religion. But parish churches, where they had not already been sold, were to be left for the use of any religious body which desired them. Where there were several such bodies, they were to use the same churches at different hours, which were to be fixed by the municipal authorities. Only a limited liberty, however, was allowed to religious bodies: they might not form any permanent fund to meet their expenses, and their ministers had to take an oath "recognizing that the universality of French citizens is sovereign and promising submission and obedience to the laws of the Republic."

Nevertheless at first things went fairly smoothly. The Constitutional Church held a National Council which remoulded its organization and drew up canons on doctrine and discipline. The papal Church, though more disorganized and with most of its priests still proscribed, also consolidated its position. The old order was now reversed, and the local authorities were more indulgent than the central government. Gradually, however, the two Chambers became less hostile, began to remove some of the disabilities and penalties, and finally on August 24, 1797, passed a law allowing all *émigrés* to return to France. But this was going too far for the Directors: within a fortnight three of them had carried out the *coup d'état* of Fructidor (Sept. 4) and restored all the laws against refractory priests.

The Fructidian persecution which followed was almost as severe as the Terror, but until recently little was known of it—chiefly because few priests were sentenced to death: instead they were banished to Cayenne or imprisoned in the hulks at Rochfort, where conditions were so bad as to win the name of *guillotine sèche*. Some of the iconoclasm of the Revolution belongs to this period: the abbey-church of Cluny was demolished by the municipality, and the cathedral of Chartres was only saved through its purchase by some members of the Constitutional Church. A new Oath of Hatred of Royalty and Anarchy was imposed on all clergy; and they were hampered in other ways. The Directors encouraged Theophilanthropism, hoping

that it would become a popular rival to Christianity, and enforced observance of the *décadi* and the *Culte Décadaire*. Theophilanthropism was a newly-invented Rousseauesque religion with an elaborately symbolic ritual based on the dual doctrine of the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. It was a voluntary society and a real though non-Christian religion, unlike the *Culte Décadaire* which was a final attempt to find some national secular celebration to take the place of religion. Every *décadi* the citizens were assembled in the parish church while officials read and commented on the laws, delivered discourses on the civic virtues, and sang patriotic songs round an altar of the *patrie*.

The Directory did not increase its popularity by these methods, and one of Bonaparte's first acts after Brumaire was to repeal most of the laws restricting liberty of worship and to recall the exiled clergy. In 1800 he began negotiations with the Pope, which after long delays and protracted negotiations resulted in the Concordat of 1802. The Catholic Church was re-established, but its dioceses were reduced in number and its property was not given back. Some of the features of the Civil Constitution were thus embodied in it, but it differed in that it had been negotiated with the Pope and safeguarded his power. In particular bishops were to be appointed by the Head of the State and given canonical institution by the Pope. The use of the parish churches was withdrawn from all other religious bodies: the *Culte Décadaire* had already collapsed, most of the Constitutionals returned to communion with the Pope, and Theophilanthropism rapidly dwindled away.

R. E. BALFOUR.

THE MESSAGE AND THEOLOGY OF BARTH AND BRUNNER

THE REVELATION AND THE REVEALER

THE most complete guide to the teaching of Barth and Brunner in English is the book written by Mr. Birch Hoyle, *The Teaching of Karl Barth*.^{*} Another useful book is *The Significance of Karl Barth* by Dr. McConnachie,[†] but he continues the misunderstanding concerning the origin of Karl Barth's message. "It arose . . . out of the crisis of the War and the crisis of Europe induced by the War . . ." (p. 73). The sketch of Barth's career, already traced by Dr. McConnachie (p. 18 ff.), should have prevented him from making this statement—a statement however which does not affect the high value of his lucid and vivid account of

^{*} Student Movement, 2nd edition.

[†] Hodder and Stoughton.

Karl Barth's teaching. A glance at two of Barth's best known works shows that his message was already being formulated before the War, and was being proclaimed in the early period of the War, and before it had become a crisis for European civilization.* Barth was ready with a message when the crisis arrived. From the year 1911 onwards, when Barth was already a parish minister, he was disturbed by the fact that the theology of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had broken down. It had ceased to be the embodiment of faith; it had lost its inspired content; it represented merely the workmanship of the human mind, using as materials the conclusions of merely human philosophy, science, history and religion. "Our naturalism, our soulless historism, and our æstheticism are mistaken. Whence arises the opposing fact that we are always in part refusing to ask after God." "We continue to have our knowledge split into a thousand parts . . . each man clinging with jealous eagerness to his own fragment, the spiritual bond being cast to the winds—you take your biology! you take your history! I have my religion! . . . We feel we must oppose a special truth about the world to a special truth about God" (*Word of God and Man*, pp. 55 ff.). "The failure of the relative type (of Christianity) consisting of experience, metaphysics, and history is so palpably, so unmistakably, before our eyes, and the demand for a something new, the *wholly* Other, the reality of God, is so definitely upon our lips" (*ibid.*, p. 75). All this was written in 1916, when the victories of the Germanic powers were at the meridian, and when neutral eyes like Barth's could scarcely have foreseen the defeat of Germany. The same discontent and unrest of mind and soul appear in the commentary on the Romans, which was composed years before, in the form of addresses to his Swiss congregation.

But Barth is neither anti-intellectual nor obscurantist. While he contends that we are not to pursue theology for its own sake, on the ground that "our quest for God cannot be due to the influence of theology and the Church," yet he affirms that our failure to ask after God is "not due to the triumph of philosophical enlightenment, ancient or modern, over dogmatism," nor to "our progress in the theoretical and practical conquest of nature." Indeed he protests against "the view that it is the thing to-day to shake off theology and for everyone to think what is intelligible"—a view which he describes as "hysterical and thoughtless. Left and right theology waits on the reader" (*Römerbrief*, 5th edition, p. 8). To be ashamed of theology is "a children's disease" (*Word of God and Man*, p. 97). His criticism of contemporary theology is levelled against its lack

* Cf. A. Keller, *Der Weg d. dialectisch. Theologie durch d. kirchliche Welt* (1931), p. 42.

of true spiritual insight and the power to inspire. "It is obvious that theology does not owe its place at the university to any arbitrary cause. It is there in response to a need and is therefore justified in being there." Yet "it is the paradoxical but undeniable truth that *as a science like other sciences* theology has no right to its place; for it then becomes a wholly unnecessary duplication of disciplines belonging to the other faculties. Only when a theological faculty undertakes to say, or at least points out the need for saying, what the others *rebus sic stantibus* dare not say, or dare not say aloud . . . only then is there reason for it (*ibid.*, p. 197 f.).

Here then, in this dissatisfaction with the state of theology and theological teaching, is to be found the origin of the Barthian system. The *occasion* of its development was the practical crisis of the preacher when faced by his congregation. "For twelve years I was a minister . . . I had my theology. . . . Once in the ministry I found myself growing away from these theological habits of thought and being forced back at every point more and more upon the specific minister's problem, the sermon. I sought to find my way between the problem of human life on the one hand and the context of the Bible on the other . . . the familiar situation crystallized in my case into a marginal note to all theology, which finally assumed the voluminous form of a complete commentary upon the Epistle to the Romans" (*Word of God and Man*, p. 100 f.).

"This critical situation itself became to me an explanation of the character of all theology. What else can theology be but the truest possible expression of this quest and questioning on the part of the minister . . . a cry for rescue arising from great need and a great hope?" . . . Oppressed by the question . . . I finally went to work upon the Epistle to the Romans, which first was to be only an essay to help me to know my own mind," and he asserts that his book will be best understood "when you hear through it all the minister's question: What is preaching?—not *How does one do it?* but *How can one do it?* (*ibid.*, p. 101 ff.). Then follows a remark which should obliterate all suspicion that Barth is attempting to publish a new kind of doctrine, a sort of new revelation: "I have told you all this to show you that my intention is not to create a new theology." As we proceed we shall see that his teaching is almost entirely orthodox, and if some details sound a little strange to English ears, that may be because they are inherited by him from his Swiss Reformed theology and from the ancient Logos theology of the Greek thinkers.

Barth also sketches the crisis of this practical problem of preaching from the point of view of the man in the pew. "On

Sunday morning when the bells ring to call the congregation and minister to church, there is in the air an *expectancy* that something great, crucial, and momentous is to happen. . . . Expectancy is inherent in the whole situation. . . . Here is a *building*, old or new, of which the very architecture, even apart from the symbols, paintings and appointments which adorn it, betrays the fact that it is thought of as a place of extraordinary doings. Here are *people* . . . who, impelled by a strange instinct or will, stream towards this building, where they seek—*what*? Satisfaction of an old habit? But whence came the old habit? Entertainment and instruction? Very strange entertainment and instruction it is. Edification? So they say, but what edification? Do they know? Do they really know at all why they are here? . . . Their being here points to the event that is expected or appears to be expected. . . . And here above all is a *man* upon whom the expectation of the apparently imminent event seems to rest in a special way . . . he will enter the pulpit and—here is daring—preach; that is, he will add to what has been read from the Bible something from his own head and heart . . . apparently *nolens volens*, speak of God, . . . God is present. The whole situation witnesses, cries, simply shouts of it, even when in minister or people there arises questioning, wretchedness, or despair” (*ibid.*, p. 104 ff.).

Thus Karl Barth's theology springs not from the War crisis—with which it certainly grapples—but from the prophet's discontent with contemporary religious teaching, and from the preacher's need of a message. “Not until our preaching arises from need will our work become a *mission*. Mission alone can legitimize preaching (*ibid.*, p. 128). Consequently Karl Barth's message is vastly more than a mere apocalyptic response to the challenge of crisis. In its origin it is not a theology of crisis, in the narrower sense, at all. It is the proclamation of a return to the radical content of all true religion, and the enunciation of the radical need of every religious teacher.

How does Karl Barth attempt to solve his problem? His reply takes us to the heart of the Barthian system. It must be “remembered as we look forward to our task that only God *Himself* can speak of God. The task of the minister is the Word of God” (*Word of God and Man*, p. 214; *Dogmatik I.*, p. 418). “God can only be known through God. . . . There is no religion which is not consciously grounded on divine revelation” (Brunner, *Mittler*, 2nd edition, pp. 3, 175). This maxim is woven by Barth into his first formal theological treatise, written when he was no longer a mere preacher, but occupying the chair of theology at Munster. He defines dogmatics as “the effort

towards the recognition of the legitimate content of Christian discourse about God and Man" (*Dogmatik* I. 1). "Human preaching can only be a *ministerium verbi*, a service towards this original Word-itself" (p. 25). His idea contains the notion of the Word, the Logos Himself being in the preaching, and he quotes the *Helvetic Confession*: *praedicatio verbi Dei est verbum dei*. The human word of the preacher remains the instrument of the Word of God, which also declared itself in the words of prophets and apostles, after it was originally spoken through the immediate revelation of the Word of God (p. 37). Thus, part of the preacher's burden is removed by the recollection that preaching is not his own, it is a manifestation of the Word of God: "To preach and to hear preached is to make room for God's own Word" (*ibid.*, p. 337). While the preacher is thus placed in a similar category with the prophets and apostles, yet "revelation is revelation, scripture is scripture, preaching is preaching not to be separated, but not to be confused" (*ibid.*, p. 415).

"Only God can speak of God"—this strikes the note of immanence as well as transcendence. We shall postpone the former till a later article, and concentrate now upon the conception of transcendence in the Barthian teaching. "God is in heaven, we are on earth—to use the symbol of human language" (*Römerbrief*, p. xiii). There is a separation between us and God which cannot be traversed by man. Surely this is a healthy challenge to much of the vague subjective teaching which fills our preaching, our religion, our psychology to-day—all our inheritance from two hundred years of theologizing, philosophizing, and now of psychologizing. This is the angle of approach of prophetic men, of Isaiah and Jeremiah, of Paul and Luther and Calvin. This is Barth's challenge to the overemphasis laid upon immanent theology in our day. The necessary prerequisite for reconciliation with God is to realize that God is completely and distinctly *other* than oneself, and is not to be grasped by any subjective movement of human thought, but is only to be apprehended after a movement from the other side, by revelation from Himself. "The relation of this God to this man, the relation of this man to this God, is for me the theme of the Bible and the sum of philosophy in one" (*Römerbrief*, p. xiii), and so completely does Barth draw a distinction between God and man that God is defined as "non-being" (*Nicht Sein*) in contrast with the material and phenomenal life of man (*ibid.*, pp. 52, 164). He admits that Plato long ago made this contrast (p. 22), and we add, so did John Scotus Erigena in the ninth century. There is no Gnostic nihilism in this conception. God is only described as "non-being" in contrast with the physical nature of human beings; "spiritual-being"

would express Barth's meaning just as well, but the dialectical form of his disquisition drives him to use antithetical language. God is "at no time identical with that which we call God, experience, conjecture and worship as God. He is the unconditioned check! over against all human unrest; the unconditioned onward! over against all human rest; the Yes! in our No! and the No! in our Yes; the first and the last, and as such unknown, never at any time a quantity (*Grösse*) present among other things known to us, God the Lord, the Creator, the Redeemer—that is the living God" (*Römerbrief*, p. 315).

Barth's meaning is that every human conception or experience of God falls short of apprehending His reality, by virtue of the fact that we as men, and therefore material, cannot approach to a true conception of the spiritual, of God. "The divine is on the further side of the human last" (*Word of God and Man*, p. 87). Man must therefore cease the attempt to define and distinguish the attributes and qualities of God, especially as God seldom speaks of Himself in revelation (*Dogmatik* I. 65). Man is only concerned with his own relation to God. God is there and I am here. What does this fact of *God there* mean to me? Yet if man's attitude to God is confined to the recognition of a relation, unenlightened by knowledge of the Object of the relation, this attitude is not merely relative (*Römerbrief*, p. 82). The relationship is definite. The fact of God's presence there is not affected by my condition of mere "relation" to Him. He is there always and the relation itself is not subject to relativity.

How then does man know that God is *there*? Not through any movement of man towards God, but of God towards man. There is no way from man to God, but of God to man (*Dogmatik* I. 162). God seeks man and finds him. Man's function is *responsibility*, to use Brunner's phrase (*Word and the World*, pp. 25, 49, 73, 119). In the Pauline admonition, "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling, for it is God which worketh in you, both to will and to work for His good pleasure," the emphasis is laid upon the work of God in saving us; if we attempt the process it can only be with fear and trembling, and ought to be with the knowledge that it cannot succeed (*cf.* Barth, *Philippenerbrief*, pp. 63-68). "All our apparent knowledge of God can only end in the confession, not that we have apprehended God, but that He has apprehended us in our blindness, in our folly" (*Christ. Leben*, p. 18 f.; *Dogmatik* I. 102). "Our apprehension of God, here and now, is our becoming recognized by God" (*ibid.*, 103).

The revelation of God to man is "not identical with an enlightening of reason, or with an actualizing of the religious pre-

disposition of man, though both find place where the revelation finds place" (*ibid.*, p. 138). Even the mystic cannot find God apart from the self-revelation of God to his soul. Nor do the Sacraments reveal them apart from revelation. Hence it is clear why Barth places himself in the line Calvin, Luther, Paul, and the Old Testament prophets, and not in that of Ritschl, Schleiermacher, Leibnitz, Origen, and all others who attempt to find God through rational, mystical, or natural religion.

The instrument of God's self-revelation is the Divine Word, the Logos. If the Word of God is laid upon the lips of the preacher, "that happens through the monarchical Word of God Himself" (*Dogmatik* I. 124). The revelation is given in personal form: if we say that God is wholly in His revelation, so we may say He is in His own person not only the revealer, but also the act of revelation. His work is identical with His person. *Deus = deus loquens*. For the *loqui* is the revelation of His being (*Sein*) as the Lord (*ibid.*, p. 138; cf. Brunner, *Mittler*, pp. 199, 205). Barth will have nothing to do with the evolutionary theory of the gradual apprehension by human reason of the divine. Nor is revelation a gradual imparting to man of more and more divine knowledge, as man slowly thinks his way towards God. Revelation is a breaking-into history. The divine personal Word, the speaking-God, envelops history at both ends. It was there before human history began. It will be there after human history has ended. It is pre-history and post-history (*Dogmatik* I. 43 ff., 230 ff.). But for the purpose of making God known to man, for the purpose of redemption, revelation, in the prophets and in *personal* form in Christ, the Word, the Logos, breaks into history, and is revealed on the plain of the human in an apocalyptic, nay in an eschatological, manner (cf. Brunner, *Mittler*, p. 195 ff.). So God finds man and "revelation is to be found in history, i.e. in a *there* and *then*, and is to be found out by history, i.e. in a *here* and *now*, by mankind asking after it. But it is only to be heard in the speech (*Rede*) of God in person—and only as that is it actually the revelation" (*Dogmatik* I. 234). Thus the sharpness of the Barthian dialectic in its most acute antithesis is turned: the far transcendent God is made imminent to, although not yet immanent in, man by the operation of the incarnate Word of man's attentive consciousness. How the revelation in this personal form becomes immanent we shall see at a later stage.

The old theology was occupied with the idea that the Word, or Son of God, appropriated human nature, human essence and being, and existence. The phrase springs out of Phil. ii. 7 (*μορφὴν δούλου λαβών*). But this does not mean a transformation (*Verwandlung*), nor is a transformation indicated by John i. 14

(ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο). It does not refer to an alteration of the divine existence of the Word, in which He is the eternal Word of the Eternal Father. The *kenosis* of which St. Paul speaks does not mean that He wholly, or partly, or in the smallest part, ceases to be what He is. Otherwise were the Incarnation not the revelation of God. His *kenosis* (emptying) does not consist in a negation, but in the positive fact that to His divine existence, which is proper to Him from eternity to eternity, He takes in addition, adds, appropriates, human existence in time. That is the novelty of the revelation, of the reconciliation, that God is very God, that He can also be more than eternal, namely temporal, more than God, namely man (*Dogmatik* I. 260; Brunner, p. 297). In the *Philippenerbrief* (p. 54 ff.) Barth emphasizes the human aspect of the *kenosis*, its specific kenotic significance. In the *Dogmatik* he is more expressly concerned with his main theme—the assumption of human nature by the Logos—the divine aspect of the *kenosis*. While the Word assumes human existence in order to be heard by man, He veils His Godhead in disgrace and shame. The offering of the Word to faith is also a surrender to offence. That the Word can and does do so is the adorable wonder of our deliverance (*ibid.*, p. 260). This wonder exists in the fact that God permitted Himself to come hither, concealed Himself, denied Himself and made Himself common in order to come to us (*ibid.*, p. 261), *i.e.* the way is from God to man, not from man to God. He continues: For every abstract view of the essence of God and man, of divine and human existence, the conception of the Incarnation of God is an absurdity, a logical, yea a religious and moral impossibility, for “God” and “man” are abstractly fundamentally opposed to one another. Only in the more concrete recognition of an act of God the Lord, an act whose paradoxical character shall never be overlooked or forgotten, is the proposition of the Incarnation possible, only in the recognition of the actuality of the Word of God spoken to us (*ibid.*, p. 261).

Barth rejects the notion of the older Lutheran scholars that the godhead *in abstracto*, the divine nature or essence, assumed manhood. Quite apart from the fact that God is only God in the active Persons of Father, Son and Spirit, so that all abstract reference to Him must be wholly abandoned, and we shall only speak of the essence or nature when we speak of His threefold personality. It must be added that if we indulge in abstraction here, the idea of the Incarnation of God will be impossible. It would then be a change either of the divine or of the human essence, or the mythological conception of a *genesis* of a third between the two. But if one thinks of the Incarnation concretely and not abstractly, if one thinks of the active (*handelnde*),

threefold personality of God in its full unlimited Godhead, then one will say with the old Reformers not *deitas caro facta*, but *Logos, Sermo factus est*. One will then understand the unity of God and man in Jesus Christ as the unity of God in action, or of the unity of the divine action as a unity whose complete incomprehensibility, apart from this action, apart from what is here in action, remains acknowledged. This conception provides occasion for the limitation neither of the Godhead nor of the manhood of the Reconciler, nor for the amalgamation of both, since plainly there is only the idea of His action or of Him as in action. . . . So we shall not recognize the God-manhood of Christ as a thing, but as an act, which at every moment demands faith, and at every moment is surrounded by the possibility of offence (*ibid.*, 261 f.).

If then actually the Word of God, the Son of God, God in a functioning Person, is the subject of the Incarnation, then the Word of God assumes true and actual manhood, human nature and human form. All which is valid for a man as such is valid for the incarnate Son of God. He exists in time in the unity of body and soul as an individual, and all in a condition of poverty, privation, punishment, in which man, distant from God, over against God, finds himself in a condition of death as the consequence of the burden of guilt. He assumes the form of a servant. Otherwise He was not actually one of us, the Word of God spoken to us, the Word of reconciliation. . . . But it must also be said that in this unity of the Word of God with our essence, God and man, the Creator and the creature, are conditioned otherwise than in other men and creatures. Man as a creature, when we think relatively, exists independently and possesses actuality in contrast with God. This is not the case here, nor is man substituted in or for himself as a person, but in this unity, the actuality, the Person is plainly no other than the Word of God himself. . . . His humanity is only a predicate of God assumed in incomprehensible condescension, of the Lord as Reconciler acting on us (*ibid.*, p. 262 f.).

The Incarnation is an act not of history but of pre-history (*Urgeschichte*). The idea is taken over from Overbeck. If the notion is, on the surface, mystifying, its meaning is clear. It signifies the manifestation of the eternal on the theatre of time. Barth develops the idea by discountenancing the significance and importance of history and of historical events and personages for faith and for man's relation to God. Thus the Incarnation, so far as it is a unique event, having its origin in eternity, is the divine which precedes history and sums it up, and cannot be adequately understood historically. It can only be apprehended theologically (*ibid.*, p. 264). But the revelation of the

Incarnate is to be found in history (*ibid.*, p. 232) even if it confounds the historian as a member of the Christian Church, as a theologian, for he is dealing with God as the subject of history, the eternal as the boundary of time, an event without analogy in the rest of history (*ibid.*, p. 336; Brunner, *Mittler*, pp. 32 ff., 63 ff., 137 ff., 386 f.).

In his earlier work, the *Römerbrief*, Barth shows that history has its function to play in the exercise of faith. Only a free paraphrase of his very condensed thought is here possible. History merges past and present in simultaneity which may be listened to. It prevents the eternal the unhistorical at either end of history from being overlooked. It discovers itself in the crisis of the soul, in the sickness unto death. Barth telescopes the function of historical writing and the facts of the historical process. History examines the events of history while it writes and while it makes them. It creates its special knowledge for religion out of the sources, which only become sources through its special religious disclosure. Of such a kind is the history of Genesis, *i.e.* Abraham's faith. History only possesses this religious audition and only becomes vocal in this religious way when it becomes ears and lips to the religious crisis (*Römerbrief*, p. 121 ff.). We have always to speak first of revelation in order to speak later of history (*Dogmatik* I. 232). It is needless to point out that Barth and his school of course recognize the function of the historian and of historical criticism in establishing the human facts of Bible history.

History therefore does not present any difficulty to the Barthian exegesis when it comes to the Virgin birth. That event is the scriptural account of the process of the Incarnation and is accepted as such. Christ is, according to His Godhead, motherless; according to His Manhood, fatherless (*Dogmatik* I. 282). The Virgin birth is the account of the entry of the revealing Word into time. Pre-history is now manifest as a miracle on the plane of history. While it is a historical event, it differs from all other historical events, in that it has the character of being the Word of God to us. The Word of God is the subject of the Virgin birth, the historical event is merely its predicate (*ibid.*, p. 272). Other events of this kind are myths. This event is prevented from being a myth by our theological knowledge. It is not an act in the ordinary sense, but an act of which God is the doer (*ibid.*, p. 273 f.).

In his attempt to uphold the sinlessness of the humanity of Jesus, Barth comes very near to the dogma of Immaculate Conception, and Mary is described as *θεοτόκος* (*ibid.*, p. 280). He grapples with the old problem of the relation of the two natures in Christ. In its soteriological aspect the crux of the question

lies in the dilemma created for the theory of the Incarnation by the concept of the fallen nature of man. If Christ be fully man, is He not therefore sinful? But if He shares in the sinful condition of man, how can He be the Redeemer? Barth struggles to avoid either horn of the dilemma by making use of a notion of Schleiermacher. There is some kind of contrast between the condition of woman and that of man, although both are sinful. Man was the original sinner, and although woman becomes involved in his sin, and so shares in it, yet she is not to be regarded as fundamentally sinful, because she did not originate sin. Hence, so far as the divine Word at the Incarnation assumed flesh through a woman, He assumed a manhood not fundamentally sinful, but only affected as an after-event or consequence of sin.

Barth's conception is influenced by Pauline thought, and is in contrast with that of Genesis, in which sin is plainly made to appear first in woman. No doubt St. Paul's anthropology is sounder than that of Genesis. He uses the term Adam as a general description of humanity, which includes woman, but lays the emphasis upon man. In order to solve the problem of the Incarnation Barth divides the Pauline anthropology in two, and sets up woman in a condition which is not fundamentally sinful. If driven to his defences he would probably deny this conclusion, but it remains at the heart of his exegesis on this question, and leaves the way open to the further conclusion either that one half of humanity, the feminine half, needs no salvation or that it has not yet achieved it. Yet if weak in his anthropology Karl Barth firmly grasps the Incarnation as a miraculous event, as the manifestation of the divine Word. So the miracle of the Virgin birth gives him no trouble. The real miracle lies not in the process of the birth of Jesus, but in the fact that the Son of God came to earth and became a man for us.

A. J. MACDONALD.

(To be continued.)

THE SINLESSNESS OF CHRIST

THAT our Lord was sinless has been continuously and from the beginning the faith of the whole Christian Church. It would be hard to find any dogmatic statement which more completely fulfils the Vincentian Canon. Only a very few writers who would call themselves Christian at all have ventured to take up the challenge (John viii. 46), "Which of you convicteth Me of sin?"

Throughout the greater part of the history of the Church

belief in the sinlessness of Christ has been closely bound up with the doctrine of Original Sin, and it is mainly in protest against certain ways of developing this doctrine that some writers have broken away from the ancient and well-nigh universal tradition. A notable example is Mr. Lenwood's recent study, *Jesus, Lord or Leader*, a book which rests its protest upon the very highest ethical grounds, and yet which seems in its very title to make a distinction at once misleading and unnecessary. Mr. Lenwood's interest is entirely on the side of righteousness and of Christian devotion. He passionately desires to follow a Leader who has achieved the victory over real sin and won His way through into the higher holiness. It is in this interest that he searches the Gospel records for everything which can be interpreted as error or criticized as sin. His criticism is not ungenerous. He admits and welcomes the solutions with which most of us have sought, perhaps too easily, to explain away the cursing of the barren fig-tree. He fully allows for the heightening of the denunciations of the Pharisees, notably in the First and Fourth Gospels. He notes the way in which John the Baptist's "O offspring of vipers" (Matt. iii. 7) is taken over, in the First Gospel only, and made a saying of Jesus Himself (Matt. xii. 34 and xxiii. 33). But when all this is admitted, there remains the apparent repudiation of ethical perfection, "Why callest thou Me good?" And, Mr. Lenwood argues in detail, when all explanations are made, our residual sources, Mark and Q, still retain much that makes it impossible to retain belief in either the sinlessness or the deity of Jesus.

To discuss this evidence in detail is futile, for reasons which we shall see later, and before we make any general comment upon Mr. Lenwood's case, we should note how deeply the belief in our Lord's sinlessness is embedded in that same New Testament from which it has been derived. The challenge in John viii. 46, already cited, is, of course, the central passage, since it purports to be a saying of Jesus Himself. But it is obviously impossible to prove the authenticity of such a saying. Very possibly it is authentic, but used, in the Johannine manner, out of its original context. If it was said, for example, in the course of the final trial scenes, its whole special significance would vanish.

But whatever is true of this passage, and after all critics might remember that it is not *necessarily* to be regarded as unauthentic, the evidence of another kind is overwhelming. This falls into three classes.

(a) There is the well-known tendency of Matthew and Luke to edit the narratives of Mark in such a way as to remove all

traces of failure or error in Jesus. This shows clearly enough the growing conviction in His inerrancy and power. Mark tells us that they brought all who were sick, and He healed many. Matthew repeats that they brought many and He healed them all (Mark i. 32-34; Matt. viii. 16). The suggestion of moral criticism which survives in Mark's account of the storm on the lake is gone in the other two Gospels (Mark iv. 38; Matt. viii. 25; Luke viii. 24).

Here the argument cuts both ways. It is beyond doubt that the growing theological consciousness of the early Church rejected any tradition which might seem to cast a stain upon the figure of Jesus. It is equally clear that some things at least in that tradition struck, for them, a jarring note. Others, which sometimes seem to us difficult—*e.g.*, the tone of some of the denunciations—are accepted and even heightened by the later writers.

(b) On the analogy of the "lamb without blemish" of the Old Testament, the sinlessness of Jesus is brought into direct relation with the efficacy of the redemptive sacrifice of Calvary. The thought was inevitable, if only from the sheer coincidence in time (the term "coincidence" is not here used to suggest anything accidental) between the crucifixion and the slaying of the Passover lambs. St. Paul's "Christ our passover is sacrificed" (1 Cor. v. 7) is followed inevitably by "Him that knew no sin He made sin for us, that we might become the righteousness of God in Him" (2 Cor. v. 21). It is probably in this connection that the term "holy" as applied to Jesus should always be interpreted, as, *e.g.*, in Acts iv. 30. This theological interest comes out most clearly of all in the Lucan birth narratives, with their stress upon the break in the physical chain of original sin. "That Holy Thing that shall be born" shall also be the perfect and spotless sin-offering (Luke i. 35).

(c) A whole series of passages show the influence of Is. liii., and the direct application of the sinlessness of Christ in fulfilment of this prophecy is made explicitly in 1 Pet. ii. 22, "Who did no sin, neither was guile found in His mouth." This correlation undoubtedly explains such a phrase as "the holy Servant" in the sermons recorded in the early chapters of Acts (iv. 30; *cf.* iii. 14). And since the fulfilment in Himself of the conception of the Suffering Servant was clearly one strong determinant of our Lord's actions, at least at the close of His ministry, it is not at all impossible that the claim to sinlessness should in the first instance be read in this connection.

Against this solid conviction of the Apostolic Church we can only set the curious hint in Heb. v. 8, "though He was a Son, yet learned obedience by the things that He suffered." Here

there is at least a suggestion of moral progress, that *procopé* which was to be so significant in the thought of Arius. But this is not, in the writer's mind, in the least incompatible with the most complete assertion of sinlessness. "For we have not a high priest that cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities; but one that hath been in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin" (Heb. iv. 15).

It is thus clear enough what the first generation of Christians believed, but in assembling the evidence we have found throughout that there is a strong theological interest in the belief, and to the pure historian nothing is more suspicious than a theological interest. Only the passage from which we started, John viii. 46, shows any consciousness that this sinlessness, the perfection of ritual purity in priest and sacrificial victim, has any close connection with a life beyond all ethical criticism. And the passage just cited from Hebrews seems definitely to separate the two. And thus, while the conviction of the Church from the beginning is beyond doubt, we are left without any very solid historical ground for disputing Mr. Lenwood's position.

A further theological consideration may be noted. A solution of the problem set by sin is sought along two divergent lines, a divergence already apparent in St. Paul's Epistles, and developing in the later history of doctrine until it is the source of the very greatest confusion. There is on the one hand the belief that there must be a new beginning, a creation in a new order, the appearance of a humanity unaffected by the taint of the Fall. The contrast between the first and second Adams is drawn out especially in 1 Cor. xv., but it also underlies the thought of Rom. v. and vi. It is the key to later doctrines of baptismal regeneration, regarded as that which cuts off the inheritance of original sin. But, as St. Paul, and as many a baptized Christian, knows only too well, the power of original sin is not destroyed. In the Christian life there is an ever-renewed struggle. And thus, on the other hand, there is the thought of a conquest of sin, not in a new creation, but in that same humanity which has sinned. This is less prominent in the New Testament, though Rom. vii. is hard to explain on other lines. But if it is altogether neglected, as Pelagius thought that Augustine neglected it, the belief in the new creation becomes a mere psychological fantasy of escape, of little moral worth, and, at the last, unconvincing to a world of men.

It is here that Mr. Lenwood's protest becomes intelligible. He urgently desires a Leader who has fought His way through to victory. Even though the victory were incomplete, that is better than a victory that is no victory at all, but an irruption upon us of another world-order, robbing us of our very birth-

right as well. The protest is in no way unworthy. It is indeed better to believe in a Christ who is man and no God, than in a Christ who is God and not man. And yet, perhaps, there is a higher way of faith still. If the Leader were Lord too, and the Lord Leader, if temptation were real and yet the victory complete at every point, is not this a higher faith, taking away nothing of the honour of man while it ascribes all honour to God? And this is the faith of the Church.

But to make such an answer to Mr. Lenwood may satisfy those who are already convinced. It does not meet his facts. What can we say as to an ethical judgment upon the recorded acts and words of Jesus?

Here we are faced at once by the utter impossibility of applying any sort of ethical standard, except in the most external manner. We do not know the facts in their fulness, in their inner motivation. Nor, indeed, could any written record be so complete, so free from selection, so searching in its inner intimacy of knowledge, that it could demonstrate sinlessness. On that basis of enquiry a single unrecorded instance would destroy the whole structure. So great an edifice of theological assurance could not have been erected upon a general inductive argument of such a kind, since, plainly, the whole body of facts could never be ascertained. We cannot, therefore, proceed against Mr. Lenwood simply by disputing his instances. The discussion of detail would be endless. There are the questions of text, of editorial handling of the tradition, of sheer misunderstanding. And at the last we should be left with a Pyrrhic victory. We might have an explanation for every disputed case, but still we should not and could not have proved sinlessness. For our records remain incomplete.

At this point, however, one consideration of some weight emerges. After all the critics of Jesus do not derive from the void the ethical standard by which they would judge Him. There are, of course, those, like Nietzsche, whose criticism is empty, since their standards of value are distorted. But in critics like Mr. Lenwood, whose criticism clearly matters, it is surely not an insignificant fact that their standard is derived from Him whom they criticize. There is no higher standard to be found amongst men.

But even so we are far from finding sure historical ground for the faith of the Church. For some the fact that it is the faith of the Church will suffice, and this is no unworthy position, since the Church itself is a historical fact of unique importance and significance, and a belief that has so long been essential to its very life must needs carry with it an assurance of the very highest order. But this certainty is not possible for all. And

in the last resort all that is really certain is the faith itself. We are still no nearer an understanding of that upon which the faith rests.

To take any further steps towards a solution we must ask more closely what exactly we mean when we speak of the sinlessness of Christ. The mere external application of an ethical standard to the details of His life has been shown to give no certain results. Nor did it appear, when we examined the evidence of the New Testament, that its writers, with at the most only a single exception, were greatly concerned to show that the life they recorded would bear criticism. Rather they regarded it as beyond criticism. It was not merely good and righteous, but holy, and its perfection is conceived in relation to the fulfilment of all that is necessary for the redemptive sacrifice of the Cross. In other words, just as the presentation of Jesus Himself is throughout, even in Mark and Q, a theological presentation, as recent criticism has made increasingly clear, so the ascription to Him of sinlessness is theological, and not simply and directly historical. It may be that we are asking more than is possible when we seek the pure history unadorned upon which the theology rests. Even so it is worth while, even for our understanding of the theology, to see whether any progress at all can be made in the task which the Ritschlians undertook so lightly, the quest of the Jesus of history which has led to such strangely divergent results.

It is too much to ask that we might know what sinlessness would have meant to our Lord Himself. It seems incredible that He should ever have dwelt upon the thought, save, at the most, in answer to some challenge, as when His disciples plucked the ears of corn upon the Sabbath, or when both He and His followers were criticized for their persistent cheerfulness. And though it must have been present to His mind in His acceptance of the dual rôle of Son of Man and Suffering Servant, it is not wholly clear that this stainless innocence is conceived in ethical terms at all. The first and most direct interpretation, at least, is that of public or forensic innocence. Nor are we entirely safe from the historical critic who asks us to prove that we are not still within the region of later theological interpretation. Can we be sure that these interpretations of our Lord's mission really go back to His own mind?

It is the suggestion of this paper that we can get some definite help in this direction by the application of modern psychological methods of enquiry. Let it be said at once, and hastily, that these methods have only a limited validity in such a case, and that it is only with the very greatest reserve, and reverence, that we can apply them to the experience of our Lord

Himself. Even the case of the Apostles is not much better, since we have no first-hand account of their experience, recorded at the time and on the spot. As every psycho-analyst knows, the interpretation of records written long after the events, and edited again and again, is precarious in the extreme. They are first-hand documents only for reading the mind of their writers, and, rather less clearly, for reading the mind of those who valued and used their work. We have no first-hand document for the mind of Christ, or for the experience of the Apostles during His time on earth. Certain types of modern psycho-analytical interpretation are at once ruled out of court by this consideration.

It is nevertheless obviously true that the editors of the tradition were writing without any thought at all of psychological theory, and therefore that they may well have preserved certain unexpected indications which confirm or cut across the theological interpretation. It is here suggested that there are such indications, and that, if they can be trusted, Mr. Lenwood's main argument is unimportant, even if some of his facts were confirmed, while his conclusion is unnecessary and unsound.

We may start from a general consideration. Man does not challenge that which puts him into touch with God. It is a fact readily to be observed in all religious movements that its members are impatient of any criticism of their leader. Hero-worship must always, for its own safety, set its object upon the highest pinnacle. For the leader, the hero, has become the embodiment of an ideal, and any attack upon him becomes an attack upon the ideals of all who follow him. They resent it, because it is an attack upon themselves.

This principle quite clearly colours some of the later editing of the Gospels. If it is the whole story, then the case for the spotlessness of the Master is precarious indeed. It would be possible to point to exactly the same situation in the case of human leaders whose lives are very obviously far from perfect.

At this point comes in a comment which I owe to Dr. Webb. It is at least remarkable that in the case of Jesus alone this claim to sinlessness has produced throughout the history of His Church not a sense of perfection, but a sense of imperfection in His followers. This can only mean that the ideal which He embodies is such that no other man can ever become wholly identified with it, and that it must always set up conflict wherever present. But to embody such an ideal as that is the function of One who is more than a Leader, since He is not merely an expression of that which is inherent in humanity, but is also creative of human standards. Such an One must also be Lord.

Put in this way, the argument rests upon the whole range of

the experience of the Church. And as an argument from experience it cannot give a complete and logical proof of the Godhead of our Lord, though it agrees well with that belief. If we restrict ourselves to the New Testament we can argue in the same way for the certainty that Jesus embodied creatively and supremely that experience which became characteristic of His followers. Their whole relation to Him, and the whole story of the Gospels and Acts, become otherwise inexplicable. But we do not find in the New Testament that the experience of the first disciples is one of ethical scrupulosity. The sin of Ananias and Sapphira is not that they lied to men. St. Paul, a hasty, stormy character, not a little troubled by uncertainties of temper, puts self-criticism aside impatiently, with a quotation from the Septuagint of Job, "I know nothing against myself, my conscience is free; in any case He that judges me is the Lord" (1 Cor. iv. 4). Access to God, obedience to the guidance of the Spirit, loyalty to the fellowship of Christ, these are the marks of the Christian. To have these is to be free from sin.

Thus sinlessness in our Lord Himself means, in the only intelligible sense of the word, the full and positive response of His whole being to the God whom He knew as Father, and therewith to the guiding of that Power which He taught men to know as the Holy Spirit. That this sinlessness was such as to account for the Christian Church we know, and for many of us that will suffice, but we still ask whether there is any indication of a finality, a completeness, in that sinlessness which makes it necessarily final and unique.

Thus we pass back to the examination of the narratives themselves, to trace, on the human side, the completeness of His response to God. And here the general witness of the whole Gospel story is striking enough. Jesus turns to the Father in prayer, trusts Him in miracle, teaches about Him with a supreme directness and authority. The remark that "the Jews sought to kill Him because . . . He called God His own Father" (John v. 18) may rest upon His own actual and habitual way of speaking, and this, if we could be sure of our interpretation, would carry us beyond anything claimed by even the greatest of human saints. For it is unthinkable to compare our Lord with either the Oriental despots, or the neurotics, who make such a claim as this. In Him alone it seems not wholly incongruous.

But we can go beyond this general witness of the Gospels. Three incidents in our Lord's life, each marking one of its great turning-points, are told in a manner which reveals something of His inner life. These are the Baptism and Temptation, which clearly form a single experience, the Transfiguration, and

the Agony in Gethsemane. With the detail of these narratives we are not concerned. But in their broad implications, and assuming that we may compare them with other human experiences, they form a striking study. To the psychologist they speak clearly enough of a life in which there is, from the Baptism, a full and complete turning to God, and yet in which there is a progressive unification. It is both true that He is sinless in His complete acceptance of the Father's will, and that temptation had to be faced and overcome in His human nature. "Without sin," yet "He learned obedience by the things which He suffered."

The mark of this to the psychologist is the completeness with which the forces which dominate His life are at first personified, and then merged in the final surrender. At the Baptism and in the Temptation the Spirit and the Satan appear as opposing forces. The objectification is complete. With the acceptance of the Spirit all that in human nature which resists such acceptance becomes merged with the figure of the great antagonist. Upon that objective plane the battle is fought out, and finally. St. Luke's comment that "when he had completed every form of temptation the devil stood away from Him until his time came" (Luke iv. 13) is editorial, and for our purpose misleading. The devil does not in fact reappear in the other two great crises of our Lord's life.

The second crisis, at the Transfiguration, is concerned with the acceptance of the Cross. Our difficulty here is that the narrative seems to proceed from Peter's experience, as reported later to Mark. But even so it seems to rest upon a real experience of our Lord Himself, and in that case we note that the recent critics who have argued that the order of the narrative is wrong, and that the Transfiguration should precede the incidents at Cæsarea Philippi, are psychologically mistaken. Just as the practical step at the Baptism brought about the accompanying and succeeding mystical experiences, so the new acceptance of the rôle of the Messiah as involving also that of the Suffering Servant brought about the Transfiguration. Again we see the personification, but the struggle is now altogether upon a higher plane. The Cross is represented not by Satan but by the friendly figures of Moses and Elijah. Only Luke tells us that they "spake of His decease which He was to accomplish at Jerusalem" (Luke ix. 31), but this addition is entirely probable, in the light of the context. At the end of the scene they too pass, and Jesus is alone. His mission is a mission that must end in the appointed way. He is at peace.

The Agony in the Garden completes the series. Here the struggle is the last and hardest of all. Mark does not use the

term "agony," which first appears in Luke, who adds the strange reference to the "sweat like drops of blood falling to the ground" (Luke xxii. 44). This seems to be an obvious heightening of the narrative, and inclines us to view with suspicion the reference to an angel: "There appeared to Him an angel from heaven strengthening Him" (Luke xxii. 43). If we accept this verse we have the phenomenon of objective personification again. But there is no such reference in Mark to any outside forces in the struggle. Mark uses the very strongest words in speaking of the conflict: "He began to be panic-stricken and distraught" (Mark xiv. 33), language a little too difficult for Matthew to copy ("He began to be grieved and distraught," Matt. xxvi. 37), or for Luke to use at all (*cf.* Luke xxii. 40, 41). But it is a human struggle, and its Hero is wholly one. There is no longer, as at the Temptation, a casting out of those elements in humanity which are the source of the conflict, and therefore no devil, no Satan, appears upon the scene. There is no sense of an outside power of the Spirit coming upon Him as with a compulsive force. He is man facing His terrific problem, not so much the bearing of physical suffering as the bearing in love of all the sin and unfaithfulness and treachery that now beset Him. He had long known that He must die. Now at last He must face the whole tragic sinfulness that was the reason for His death.

Here then again, if we follow our oldest sources, we have a clear psychological picture, the picture of a life wholly unified, and wholly turned to do the will of God. There could be no greater contrast than that between the opening scene on the bank of the Jordan and the closing scene in the Garden. The narrative of the Transfiguration forms the exact link which we need to make the picture complete. It is the picture of One who, in human nature as it was and is, with all the strain and weakness of those things which are in man the occasion of sin, yet made in one great crisis the free and full choice of the Father's Will, and then so lived that at the last, be the period of the ministry one year or three, He had unified all within Himself and in a last crisis fought out the battle once more, offering a humanity one, sinless, and complete to do the Father's Will.

This is as far as the psychological evidence can take us. Obviously it cannot and does not prove sinlessness in Mr. Lenwood's sense. Still less can it be used to prove that Jesus is God. But it does give us something which sets the concept of sinlessness in a new light, and which goes far to explain the experience, and the later conviction, of the Apostles.

But here we may add a striking and well-known fact of

history. It is precisely in Mark's account of the Baptism and the Temptation that we come for the first time to a fully personal and objective Spirit who is wholly good and to an equally definite and unified personal devil. Both concepts had had a long history, as is natural, since both arise within the experience of man. But in the New Testament there is a new, and as it would seem necessarily a final, stage in that development. In particular the devil had been sometimes man's antagonist, and sometimes a cosmic power, but he had never before been wholly an ethical principle of evil, tempting man to a purely moral failure. And the climax comes not in the mind of the theologian but in the experience of Jesus Himself. We seem to see here something that may properly be called unique, and which suggests that we have a right to go beyond the psychological evidence and to see the sinlessness of Jesus as unique also.

A brief survey of the relevant passages in the four Gospels will serve to show how completely Mark is consistent with this primitive picture of our Lord. The Spirit is conceived as a living, external power, the only power to which absolute loyalty is demanded. Thus the sin against the Holy Spirit becomes the one unpardonable sin. "All sins and blasphemies shall be forgiven the sons of men," a strange remark if sinlessness were just ethical perfection, "but whosoever shall blaspheme against the Holy Spirit hath no forgiveness in the New Age, but is guilty of eternal sin" (Mark iii. 28, 29). Here we see just what sinlessness is and what it is not. The confusion with ethics has led to almost unlimited misunderstanding.

The only other reference to the Holy Spirit in this Gospel (Mark xiii. 11), "It is not ye that speak, but the Holy Spirit," is less important, but fits in well with the same picture.

The further references to the devil, or Satan, must be read in connection with the frequent references to the unclean spirits, or demons. Satan appears again in Mark iii. 22-30 as the prince of a kingdom which cannot stand if divided against itself, in Mark iv. 15 as an external power, undoing the work of the Sower, and in the rebuke to Peter (Mark viii. 33). The first of these passages is of real psychological interest and importance, and all three fit well into the picture which Mark draws.

But more significant still are the references to the unclean spirits (Mark i. 23-27, i. 32-34, i. 39, iii. 11, iii. 15, iii. 22-30, v. 1-20, vi. 13, vii. 25-30, ix. 17-29, ix. 38). It is at once obvious, when we escape from attempts to turn our Lord into a modern scientific thinker, that His mission began as an attack upon the demon-world, with its hold upon man in sickness and in mental disorder. When (Mark i. 22) He is said to have gone

forth preaching "with authority, and not as the scribes," that authority is immediately explained by the healing of a man with an unclean spirit, and the excited comment is, "What is this? A new teaching, with authority! He commands the unclean spirits and they obey Him!" (Mark i. 27). This purpose in His mission is explicitly stated (Mark iii. 15), and it is equally definitely assigned, in this oldest source, as the reason for the appointment of the twelve: "He appointed twelve that they might be with Him and that He might send them forth to preach, and to have authority to cast out the demons" (Mark iii. 14, 15). The expansions in the other Gospels are a testimony to the primitive character of this tradition.

In all this what concerns us is the strong sense of the objective existence of evil powers. Man had always believed in demons. So far from merely accommodating Himself to this belief it would seem to be rather true that Jesus believed in them even more clearly and definitely still. He had faced the full force of evil and had conquered. He carries the war into the enemy's camp.

But that is not the whole picture. We note that this warfare against the demons is confined, in this Gospel, to the early ministry. The references are frequent down to Mark vii. 25-30. There is then a strange gap, and a still stranger healing. As we saw, the Transfiguration seems to show a new phase in our Lord's experience. He is no longer facing evil along the simpler line of direct attack. The Cross must be faced, and faced as the fulfilment of God's revealed will in the prophetic figure of Is. liii. Evil and good are not so clearly distinct as it had seemed. And at that very time of new decision He comes down to find His puzzled disciples faced with failure. They could not cast out the demon from the epileptic boy. He wrought the miracle, but a new problem was set. "This kind goes not forth save by prayer" (Mark ix. 17-29). Was the simple "authority" then of no avail. Must human nature be bent to yet higher achievement? It is noteworthy that from this moment the demons disappear from the Gospel, and, apparently, from our Lord's mind, save for the passing reference where He rebukes the disciples for checking the activity of an outsider who was casting out demons in His name. The passage is striking because it shows the new orientation of the teaching. The incident is made the basis of an ethical instruction upon the dangers of giving offence (Mark ix. 38-50). The demons pass wholly out of view. The face of Jesus is set towards the Cross.

In all this we have a single consistent picture, pre-Pauline, pre-theological, and obviously quite naïve. It would be in-

credible that any writer of that period should have had the modern theories of psychological development in view, or should have been able to invent a picture true to the typical passage from phenomena of crisis to the simple and unified disposition in which those phenomena merge.

When we come to the other Gospels the essential picture remains, but it is in varying degrees overlaid with other material, not always very consistent. Matthew conforms practically completely to the Marcan tradition. The most important passages may conveniently be tabulated:

Matt. i. 18-20: The mention of the Holy Spirit in the Birth stories here and in Luke i. 35 stands quite apart. We have moved to a totally new standpoint historically and theologically.

Matt. iii. 13 to iv. 11: The account of the Baptism and Temptation is greatly expanded, but the essential features are unchanged. The Spirit now "leads" rather than "drives" Jesus into the wilderness (iv. 1), and Satan, except in one of the replies made by Jesus, is throughout called "the devil."

Matt. vi. 24, "Ye cannot serve God and Mammon," gives the psychological key to the whole sequence.

Matt. ix. 34, "By the prince of the demons He casts out the demons," is a Western "non-interpolation" and rests on Matt. xii. 24. Matt. x. 25 also rests on Matt. xii. 24. Matt. xii. 24-30 directly follows the Marcan tradition (Mark iii. 22-30) both as to Satan and as to the Holy Spirit.

Matt. xxv. 41: The passage in the Parable of the Great Assize which speaks of "the fire prepared for the devil and his angels" is utterly unlike any other saying of Jesus. It certainly does not come from the obviously primitive tradition with which we have been dealing. If it is an authentic saying, and there is some evidence within the parable itself for its originality, it has come in with other apocalyptic material from some source unknown.

Matt. xxvi. 36-45: The narrative of Gethsemane directly follows Mark and introduces no divergent features.

Thus Matthew, despite its large embodiment of other material, does not seriously alter the primitive tradition as to the Spirit, the devil, or the sinlessness of Jesus.

Matters are very different when we come to Luke. We have already noted the new and theological quality of the references in the Birth narratives. Quite apart from all questions of historicity the language of Luke i. 35 is unquestionably the product of theological thinking. We may again tabulate a few of the relevant passages:

Luke i. 35: cf. Luke ii. 25, 26.

Luke iii. 21, 22: The account of the Baptism makes the descent of the Spirit simply an objective fact. It does not connect it, as Mark does, with the experience of Jesus.

Luke iv. 1-14: The phrases "Jesus, full of Holy Spirit, went up from Jordan, and was led in the Spirit in the wilderness," are completely at

variance in the earlier presentation. So also is "And Jesus went up in the power of the Spirit into Galilee." The phrases are theological and remind us at once of the immanentism of Rom. viii. The full objective personification has vanished.

Luke iv. 18, "The Spirit of the Lord is upon Me," quoting Is. lxi. 1, 2, adds to this the connection with prophecy, and the theological circle is complete. But by now we have lost touch altogether with the primitive picture. It is wholly clear that we are moving in a later, a more developed and self-conscious system of thought.

It is hardly necessary to carry the analysis further. Such passages as Luke viii. 12, xiii. 16 ("whom Satan hath bound"), xxii. 3 (editorial, "Satan entered into Judas"), and xxii. 31 ("Simon, Simon, Satan hath desired to have you"), fit fairly well into the primitive picture.

Luke x. 17, 18 ("I beheld Satan fallen as lightning from heaven") remains a mystery, and is at least without parallel in the Gospels. We have already noted the significant changes in the Gethsemane narrative.

Passages in connection with the Holy Spirit are of a type quite distinct from those in Mark—e.g., Luke ii. 25, 26, iii. 16, x. 21, xii. 12. Note especially "How much more shall your heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit to them that ask Him" (xi. 13).

The Fourth Gospel carries us still further afield. John the Baptist is now said to share the experience at the Baptism (John i. 32). The teaching as to the Spirit runs throughout the Gospel, and all psychological background for it is gone (e.g., John iii. 5-9 and John xiv.-xvi. *passim*). The teaching as to the devil becomes equally complex and theological, and its background is no longer in the experience of Jesus, but in the disposition of His opponents (John viii. 44). This is quite a new touch, utterly foreign to the Synoptic records. In John xii. 27-30 we have a doublet of Gethsemane, showing God objectified in the Passion conflict. But the whole passage is clearly over-written on theological grounds. "The Voice came not for My sake, but for yours" (John xii. 30). The omission of the Gethsemane narrative at its proper place again shows the complete break with the older, and in this respect clearly better, tradition. The remark in John xiii. 27, that Satan entered into Judas Iscariot, is not in this connection significant.

What then emerges from our whole study? There is a striking vindication of the primitive and pre-Pauline character of Mark, a vindication which points not only to a primitive tradition embodied in that Gospel, but to the primitive character of the Gospel as a whole. And there is a suggestion still more striking, if we dare trust our method and our evidence, as to the essential character of the experience of Jesus Himself. It points us to a Life at once heroic in endeavour and completely receptive of the Divine Will. It shows us the completest possible turning of human nature to God, from the Baptism right through to the Cross itself. And yet it shows

that such a life was not without development, so that the work of the Incarnation always being perfectly fulfilled, is yet not complete until, in Gethsemane, humanity, wholly one in the Divine Spirit, faced the Cross of man's sin and shame.

We still have not answered Mr. Lenwood. But if all this is true, is any answer needed? The Jesus depicted by Mr. Lenwood, faithfully and finely drawn though He be, is yet in effect the Jesus of the Ritschlian tradition, the Jesus of Harnack and of Dr. T. R. Glover. Such a Jesus inevitably needs an ethical vindication, if any theology is to be built about Him. And no such vindication can ever be complete and beyond the possibility of cavil. But it is clear that the Jesus of whom we have found traces is very different from the Jesus of an ethical Liberal Protestantism. No point of kinship has appeared save the recognition of a certain development in that humanity which so fully and so constantly accepted the Father's will. Here it is, of course, possible to find a place for a part of Mr. Lenwood's argument. But his dogmatic conclusions fail. We are in fact far nearer to the theological Messianic Christ of some recent critics, such as Sir Edwyn Hoskyns and Mr. Davey in this country, and Gerhard Kittel and Hermann Sasse in Germany. *Mysterium Christi* and *The Riddle of the New Testament* are the first statements in English of a development of *Formgeschichte* which avoids the negations of such writers as Bultmann, and recognizes the great value of our earliest sources as bearing witness throughout to the Messianic Jesus, whose every word and act is viewed in relation to its Old Testament background. If our psychological analysis has any weight at all it points to the survival of a tradition which at least makes this development of the Gospel records comprehensible. We have gone further than writers of this school in recognizing real human development and progress. We have suggested that the full acceptance of all the implications of the Messianic rôle was gradual, and that the earlier phases of the ministry were superseded as the new problems and the new understanding grew. And this is, to some small extent, a vindication of that chronology which is now so often discarded altogether. But our portrayal points not merely to a human Jesus. It is a response in humanity to an act of God, and that Man in whom humanity rose in such response must indeed have been, as no other before or since, *capax deitatis*.

L. W. GRENSTED.

MISCELLANEA

NOTES AND COMMENTS

AMONG contributors to the present issue Father Hebert and Professor Grensted are already known to our readers; but Dr. Macdonald has not, we believe, written in *THEOLOGY* before. A staunch Evangelical, Dr. Macdonald has shown himself, by his books on Lanfranc and on Berengar, a learned mediævalist and a careful student of Eucharistic doctrine. Mr. R. E. Balfour is a Fellow of King's College, Cambridge.

The Rev. F. McKenzie, Rector of Hale, Lincolnshire, writes as follows with regard to Dr. B. S. Easton's article entitled, "The Problem of Confirmation," which we published last month:

"In Professor Easton's treatment of this subject in the March issue of *THEOLOGY*, no mention is made of the late Bishop of Ely's 'Confirmation in the Apostolic Age.' I have lent or mislaid my copy, but my recollection of this little book is that Dr. Chase would strongly demur to the position ascribed by Professor Easton to St. Paul in relation to Confirmation. Dr. Chase regarded 2 Tim. i. 6 as referring not to the Ordination of Timothy, but to his Confirmation. If this be so, the question of the Pauline authorship does not arise, if the matter of the Pastoral Epistles is derived from a Pauline source. Dr. Chase's book should be read by those unacquainted with it."

NOTES ON PERIODICALS

Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses. October, 1931.

In this number Father P. Dumont, S.J., continues his enquiry into the history of the innate desire for supernatural beatitude or for the intuitive vision of God, whether it can justly be called "natural" or not. He passes in review several post-reformation authors, mostly, in this instalment, of Scotist sympathies. This desire, according to them, is natural, but it is only an obscure tendency, hidden and silent, towards the *summum bonum* of human nature. Thomists, on the other hand, avoid speaking of a "natural" appetite in this connection at all. Cajetan, for example, prefers to say that man has an "obediential potency" for the Divine Vision. But Father Dumont contends that these are differences of formula rather than of belief, although some authorities, illogically and falsely, according to him, seem in parts of their work to try to demonstrate in man a natural capacity for seeing God.

This article is followed by a careful discussion in Latin on the vexed question of "*consulere minus malum*." If a man is intent on committing a sin, is it right to advise him to commit a less sin in place of a more grievous? The casuist Lehmkuhl has been cited as holding the laxer view on this matter, but Father Pender, the author of the present article, warns the reader that, even if this be true, Lehmkuhl's doctrine is not necessarily identical with that of the Catholic Church. In the long discussion which follows, the cases of Lot and of Ishmael (Jeremiah lxi. 8) come under review and also a text of Chrysostom. What is allowable is not

that any sin should be *advised*, but that on certain occasions the possibility of a lesser sin may be pointed out or revealed. Thus, Cajetan says of duelling "*non licet inducere ad duellum vel consulere duellum sed licet offerre duellum.*" The author distinguishes between inducing to sin and dissuading from a more serious sin. It can never be right to counsel or persuade to sin great or small. The uncertainty found to exist on this question calls, in the author's opinion, for a revision of some manuals of moral theology which are often misleading.

There is a very favourable review of Goossens' "*Les origines de l'Eucharistie Sacrement et Sacrifice*," together with the other usual features and chronicle of events.

W. R. V. BRADE.

Bulletin of the John Rylands Library. January, 1932.

A large part of this number is devoted to Dr. Johnson and his circle. There are here printed a selection of hitherto unpublished letters by the Doctor himself, three Dialogues by Mrs. Thrale, and some correspondence by Fanny Burney and others. Another article gives us in full the Chronicle of John Strecche for the reign of Henry V. (1414-1422), dealing with the campaign of Agincourt, etc. The most interesting article for readers of THEOLOGY will be the current instalment of Dr. Mingana's "Woodbrooke Studies," which consists of the first five chapters, in Syriac with English translation, of a treatise or instruction on the Nicene Creed by no less a person than Theodore of Mopsuestia. This document shows how near the great Antiochene theologian came to the Nestorian heresy without, however, really falling into it. In the chapters here published Theodore's words lend no countenance to any doctrine of "Two Persons"; the exact questions put by Nestorius are not yet above the horizon. In the comment on "*And in one Lord Jesus Christ*," he says of the Son of Mary, "He is God because of the close union with that Divine Nature which is truly God." The terms "Only Son" and "first-born of all creatures" allude to the Two Natures, but the Nicene Fathers "referred both words to the one Person of the Son." Theodore is emphatic on the point that Christ assumed a rational human soul. He more nearly approaches Nestorianism when he says "the grace of God kept the man whom God put on for us free from sin"—but the reader will call to mind the phrase of St. Augustine "*hominem quem gerebat*" (*Civ. Dei*, 11, 21)—and again, "God . . . who for us put on the man our Lord Jesus and transferred Him through His resurrection from the dead to a new life." As Dr. Mingana points out, some of these passages were quoted against Theodore in the (Latin) Acts of the Fifth Council, dealing with the matter of the "Three Chapters" (563 A.D.). As against the Arians it is interesting to notice that Theodore sees the "*differentia*" of a creature in "being made out of nothing." This seems to be the most valuable MS. yet published in this series, and its continuation will be awaited eagerly.

W. R. V. BRADE.

The Journal of Religion. Vol. xii., No. 1.

Vittorio Machioro suggests that the Gospels retain a sensitiveness for the difference between *πτωχός* and *πενής* which was lost in Hellenistic Greek, and therefore that *πτωχοί* in the first Beatitude means "unhappy,

restless, disappointed poor, not satisfied poor." Blessedness is a reward for dissatisfaction with the poverty which you once had accepted and liked; for passing from the condition of being *πενής*, poor man, to that of *πτωχός*, beggar. The grounds for this distinction are not too clear. Classical authors are quoted to prove it, and our Lord is said to have taken His inspiration from the Septuagint of Isaiah lxi. 1. But the question of whether the original speech of the Beatitudes was Aramaic is passed over. Nevertheless the point is an interesting one.

H. S. MARSHALL.

The Canadian Journal of Religious Thought. Vol. viii. No. 6.

By his insistence that Christianity is not only curative but creative Mr. Richard Roberts agrees with Mr. Barry. In an analysis of Personality he points to the dissatisfaction of human kind with itself. When all the wants are supplied that this world of sense provides for, man is still crying, "I want." He is pursued by a nostalgia, a sort of homesickness. He suffers, too, from a definite feeling of disharmony, comprehended under the term *sin*, accompanied by guilt, a sense of bondage and of being cut off from his own proper moorings. In short, his personality is disintegrated. The only gospel yet given to man which enables him to achieve fulness of personality is the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ. This Gospel integrates by changing his *status* by Redemption, Adoption, Reconciliation and Justification; and his *nature* by New Birth. The achievement of personality in the Christian sense is an affair of continual new beginnings; negatively, renunciation of the animal in us: affirmatively, a striving towards the prize of the high calling of God in Jesus Christ.

H. S. MARSHALL.

REVIEWS

THE PORTSMOUTH SYLLABUS OF RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION.
Published by the Religious Education Committee of the
Diocese of Portsmouth. 2s.

THE STORY OF CHRISTENDOM. Part. I. By C. M. Duncan-
Jones. St. Christopher Press and S.P.C.K. 2s.

The last few years have seen a steady increase of interest in religious teaching. A considerable number of Education Committees, both Diocesan and County, have lately been showing a growing recognition of the vast importance of the subject in their schools. There is a growing realization that, granted the Cowper-Temple clause, if the teaching of the Bible is to be attempted successfully in any school, it must include wise selection and explanation, and that furthermore the Bible cannot be studied altogether without regard for its religious content. The Leicester Education Committee have sponsored a most valuable book of prayers and hymns, showing their consciousness of the need for helping teachers in the matter of the school services; while in the Appendix to the *Little Bible*—an anthology published by the Oxford University Press for the same authority—they sketched out the general lines which the course of religious teaching might take, and attempted to help "Teachers and Parents" to see some of the possibilities which the subject offers, both for younger and older children. A number of other authorities have worked out syllabuses, more or less detailed, to which the Portsmouth Syllabus will be a valuable addition, mainly for two reasons. The first is its completeness. No other has appeared with anything like this detail. The second is the full treatment given to the Prayer Book and the services of the Church. This begins with the very youngest children, who can already understand descriptions of the "special days" of the Church and something of their significance, and it is continued throughout. It includes not only lessons on the catechism, but also, for example, on the *Te Deum* and *Magnificat*, the Communion Service, and Mattins and Evensong in general. Teachers not only in Church schools, but in the elementary schools as a whole, and in secondary schools also, will no doubt find this part of the syllabus of great value; though, as noted in the Preface, "there is a provision of alternative sections, in order that the syllabus may be completely useful in schools where teaching must have regard to the Cowper-Temple cause."

There may be said, broadly speaking, to be two periods in the growth of the child's mind while he is at an elementary

school. The first is the age of imagination, when his mind works exquisitely to supply the detail in what he hears or reads or thinks. At this age historical truth is neither here nor there. Truth and legend are indistinguishable. What is important is experience or feeling, and children feel at this time with greater intensity, most probably, than they will ever feel again. It is a time which from the cultural standpoint is immensely significant. Occasionally one realizes that the difference between deep and shallow is the difference between the mind which has as its background the lore assimilated at this immature age, and the mind which has not. The rationalism of the earlier part of this century bid fair to destroy this background altogether. Now we seem to be beginning to appreciate its value once more. A valuable feature of the Portsmouth Syllabus is its guidance on this particular point. Canon Raven has maintained that the lore of the New Testament alone is suitable for young children. Here, however, are suggested side by side passages from the Old and New Testaments for use even in the early stages, illustrating those attributes of God which can be understood by the very young; and the selection proves abundantly the use that can and should be made of Old Testament material.

The second phase is that when the mind turns from legend to reality, when it is thirsty for facts and details, and is sceptical of anything that "did not really happen." During this phase there comes into existence the intense interest in history, because it is history and not merely story, because Christ actually lived and was a real person in a historical context about which we know not a little from other sources. The transition between the two phases (which is in practice the most difficult thing which the teacher has to accomplish) is in this syllabus taken between the eleventh and twelfth years—that is at what is now being called the "age of transfer." There begins at this point an insistence on historical truth, with the first outlines of the idea of religious development, and the first summary of Church history connecting the times of the Gospel with the times when "English history begins." There has hitherto been no book covering this period which the non-specialist teacher could use freely and hand, if necessary, to the clever pupil. The first part of Mrs. Duncan-Jones' *Story of Christendom* now fulfils this need. The book is history, illustrated throughout by reference to the sources from which its material is drawn. It is exceedingly readable, and has some useful diagrammatic maps. The importance of including some such study as this at this period in the school life can hardly be overstressed. By showing the historical continuity of the whole it can give a new sense of reality to Old Testament history

and (most important of all) to the life of Christ. This volume begins with "the world ready for Christ" and covers the first thousand years of the history of the Church.

In this connexion may be noticed an unusual feature of the Portsmouth Syllabus—the inclusion of maps and illustrations. These have been limited (no doubt from considerations of economy) to line drawings, of rather unequal value; and another map, showing the position of Palestine in relation to the great empires, Egypt, the Hittites, Assyria, Babylon and Persia, would have been welcome. Too often Palestine in the child's mind has no geographical relation whatever to the rest of the world. Teachers may find section A of the Appendix, "Notes for the lessons on our Lord's Life in Palestine," more useful than the illustrations in giving the feeling of reality to the story. These excellent notes are mainly of a descriptive geographical character. It is probably the detailed development of the syllabus as a whole, however, that will make it most widely appreciated. It is constantly pausing to explain and suggest—to quote, for example, from Moffat's translation or Driver's Commentary on Genesis. No syllabus worked out on this scale has hitherto appeared. W. F. OAKESHOTT.

SCIENCE AND RELIGION

THE GREAT AMPHIBIUM. By Joseph Needham. S.C.M. Press.

5s.

THE CASE AGAINST EVOLUTION. By G. B. O'Toole. Macmillan. 9s.

EVOLUTION AND THEOLOGY. By E. C. Messenger. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 1s. 6d.

Of these three books whose titles are given above, the first is by a distinguished scientist who was once a practising Christian and who appears to be losing his confidence in the Catholic faith; the second by a Roman Catholic scientist who is concerned to prove that evolution, so far from being a fact, is a hypothesis riddled with difficulties; and the third by a Roman Catholic theologian anxious to prove that evolutionary theories can be reconciled with the doctrines of the Church.

Let us begin with *The Great Amphibium*, which borrows its title from Sir Thomas Browne: "Thus is MAN," writes the author of the *Religio Medici*, "that great and true Amphibium, whose nature is disposed to live, not only like other creatures in divers elements, but in divided and distinguished worlds." That the worlds of religion and science must for ever remain divided and distinguished, is the thesis of Dr. Needham's book.

Dr. Needham is one of those rare people who write with great knowledge both on religion and science; and not only with knowledge, but in a delightful style. He has an inventive and original mind, and there is hardly a page in his book which is not enriched by some striking apothegm or some challenging epigram. He has the gift of seeing old truths from a new angle, as witness the following quotations:

"No opposition has been more violent and long continued in the past than that between the organized apprehension of the world's ultimate mystery, which we call religion, and the organized investigation of the world's apparent mechanism, which we call science."

"There is much truth in the well-known assertion that religion is the opium of the people, but we do not get very far by simply conferring this distinction on science instead."

"It hardly becomes science, which has so many superstitions of its own, to attack those of religion."

In his first essay Dr. Needham discusses, among other things, the conflict between Millenarianism and Mysticism. He defines Millenarianism as "the belief that there's a good time coming, actually here on earth, and at no distant date." Millenarianism rejects suffering and discomfort as wholly bad: Christian Mysticism welcomes suffering as necessary discipline. "Thou shalt come to this estate," wrote Thomas à Kempis, "that tribulation shall seem sweet and thou shalt relish it and greet it for its sake . . . as long as it is a grievance to thee to suffer and thou desirest to escape, so long shalt thou be ill at ease." "It is here," writes Dr. Needham, "that we come upon a fundamental source of antagonism between science and religion, for millenarianism and mysticism are nothing but the mirror images of the two great forms of experience. Hence the sort of person with whom we are all familiar, whose religion is a mixture of kindness to animals and vague hopes for 'social betterment,' is not a religious person at all, but a muddle-headed well-wisher, oscillating in a vacuum between two poles of spiritual energy, the meaning of neither of which is known to him."

Thinkers may be divided into those who, like Dr. Needham, realize that life is essentially tragic unless its highest values are safeguarded in an eternal order, and those who, like the popular prophets of today, such as Mr. Wells, pin their faith on science and cherish the pathetic illusion that an idealistic philosophy can be constructed from millenarianism.

The main thesis of Dr. Needham's challenging book is the irreconcilability of science and religion. Each form of experience, he tells us, must be accepted *cum grano salis*—with sceptical

reserve. That Science and Religion have each their own particular sphere, none would dispute. Science is concerned with solving the problem, "How does the universe work?" and religion with solving the problem, "What does the universe mean?" None the less the implication which runs through Dr. Needham's concluding essay, that a thing may be true for science and false for religion, is a revival of the old heresy of Averroes, a heresy which, from the religious point of view, is a council of despair.

If religion can only survive at the expense of reason, let us abandon religion. If the gods have died, let us bury them decently rather than maintain the pretence that there is still life in the corpse. The basest of all surrenders is to surrender our belief that truth is absolute and that a doctrine cannot be both true and false at the same time.

I seem to detect in Dr. Needham's book a failure of nerve. He is perhaps a victim of that modern conspiracy which represents the relation between religion and science as a relation of conflict. I may be dense, but I have never yet been able to discover in what respect modern scientific discoveries affect religion. The fundamentalist may, perhaps, be bothered by geology, but, as we shall see, there is no conflict between evolution and Roman Catholicism, though there may well prove to be a real conflict between evolution and scientific truth.

I have recently been engaged on a book shortly to be published under the title of *Difficulties*, which consists of a series of letters in which Father Ronald Knox and I have debated the Roman Catholic claims. In my attack on the Roman position I never once felt it necessary to appeal to science. The main difficulties, such as indulgences, infallibility, and eternal punishment, are unaffected by modern scientific discoveries.

And what is true of Roman Catholicism in particular is true of Christianity in general.

Professor O'Toole is concerned to prove that evolution may be a good working hypothesis, but is far from being a proven fact.

I make no pretence to scientific knowledge, but I have read pretty widely in evolutionary literature, and I am flattered to find that the thesis which I maintained in a book of mine, called *The Flight from Reason*, is supported by so distinguished a scientist as Professor O'Toole. In that book I maintained that evolutionists were guilty of the very vices which they ascribe to theologians. The evolutionist argues in a circle, fits his facts to a preconceived theory instead of fitting his theory to the facts, and displays far more ingenuity in inter-

preting the geological record than any fundamentalist has ever shown in interpreting the Bible in accordance with his theory of verbal inspiration. In my book I have pointed out that the evolutionist appeals to the imperfections of the geological record to explain the absence of missing links, but dates his fossils on the assumption that the geological record is reasonably complete, and I am much interested to find that Professor O'Toole makes the same point.

"Evolutionists should not forget that, in sacrificing the substantial completeness of the record to account for the absence of intermediate species, they are simultaneously destroying its value as a proof of the relative position of organic types in time. Yet this, as we have seen, is precisely the feature of greatest strategic value in the palaeontological 'evidence' for evolution. We must have absolute *certainty* that the reputed 'ancestor' was in existence prior to the appearance of the alleged descendant, or the peculiar force of the palaeontological argument is lost. It would be preposterous for the progeny to be prior to, or even coeval with, the progenitor, and so we must be quite sure that what we call 'posterity' is really posterior in time. Now the sole argument that palaeontology can adduce for the posterity of one organic type as compared with another is the negative evidence of its non-occurrence, or rather its non-discovery, in an earlier geological formation. The lower strata do not, so far as is known, contain the type in question, and so it is concluded that this particular form had no earlier history. Such an inference, as is clear, is not only liable to be upset by later discoveries, but has the additional disadvantage of implicitly assuming the substantial completeness of the fossil record, whereas the absence of intermediate species is only explicable by means of the assumed incompleteness of the selfsame record. The evolutionist is thus placed in the dilemma of choosing between a substantially complete, and a substantially incomplete, record. Which of the alternatives, he elects, matters very little, but he must abide by the consequences of his decision; he cannot eat his cake and have it."

Professor O'Toole proves that the evolutionist not only insists on having his cake and eating it, but also argues in a circle. Here is a perfect example of the vicious circle.

In an undisturbed area the geologist assumes that the lower strata are the oldest, and consequently dates his fossils by the order of the strata. If he finds fossilized birds in the top strata and fossilized ferns in the lower strata, he assumes that birds appeared on the surface of the globe at a later date than ferns. The next step is to date the rocks by the strata. "Thus it comes to pass, in the last analysis, that fossils, on the one hand, are dated according to the consecutive strata in which they occur, and strata, on the other hand, are dated according to the fossils which they contain."

Consider, for instance, the famous pedigree of our old friend *Equus*, the horse. Here, at last, it would seem that the evolu-

tionists have succeeded in producing something which really looks like a genuine evolutionary theory; beginning with little *Eohippus*, and ending with *Equus*. But to the dismay of evolutionists the pedigree which so fascinated Huxley has misbehaved in the most disturbing fashion. Descendants insisted on turning up in rocks older than those which contained the records of their reputed ancestors. *Equus*, for instance, must not be allowed to have existed in Miocene times. In India *Equus* turned up in rocks which were originally classed as Miocene, but in a geological map, hurriedly revised, the troublesome rocks were assigned to the Pliocene period. "Evidently," says Professor O'Toole, "the Horse must reconcile himself perforce to the pedigree assigned to him by the American Museum of Natural History; for he is to be given but scant opportunity of escaping it. . . . An elastic criterion like the index fossil is admirably adapted for readjustments of this sort, and the evolutionist who uses it need never fear defeat. The game he plays can never be a losing one, because he gives no other terms than: Heads I win, tails you lose."

The fact that fossils are constantly turning up in strata where they have no business to be if evolution is true, forces the orthodox evolutionist to adopt hypotheses which call for a livelier faith than any miraculous happenings in the Bible. Rocks which contain recent fossils must be older than rocks which contain older fossils, even if they have apparently been deposited above them. To meet this difficulty we are asked to believe that vast sheets of older rock have been dislocated to make way for younger rock. "Immense mountain masses are said to have been detached from their roots and pushed horizontally over the surface (without disturbing it in the least), until they came finally to rest in perfect conformity upon 'younger' strata, so that the plane of slippage ended by being indistinguishable from an ordinary horizontal bedding plane. . . . R. G. McConnell, of the Canadian Survey, comments on the remarkable similarity between these alleged 'thrust planes' and ordinary stratification planes, and he is at a loss to know why the surface soil was not disturbed by the huge rock masses which slid over it for such great distances. . . . With such a convenient device as the 'overthrust' at his disposal, it is hard to see how any possible concrete sequence of fossiliferous strata could contradict the preconceptions of an evolutionary geologist. The hypotheses and assumptions involved, however, are so tortuous and incredible, that nothing short of fanatical devotion to the theory of transformism can render them acceptable."

Evolution and Theology is a comprehensive and authoritative

discussion of the official attitude of the Roman Catholic Church to evolution. The second and third parts of this book, devoted respectively to *The Origin of Living Beings* and *The Origin of Man*, contain a fascinating historical survey of the views of theologians from the early fathers to modern times on these great problems.

The author sums up the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church on the alleged simian origin of man as follows:

"The Church says:

(1) "There is nothing in this notion intrinsically repugnant either to the Scriptures or to Faith;

(2) "She will not affirm it, even supposing it were true, because it is not her business to make such affirmations;

(3) "Since she has not yet, in her practical judgment, yet obtained proofs from science of a sufficiently high order of moral certitude, she will not permit anyone to assert it as a fact while speaking in her name;

(4) "When and if it receives physical proof as certain as (let us say) that enjoyed by the theory of gravitation as it left the hands of Newton and Keppler, it will no doubt be included in the regular programme of her scholastic establishments;

(5) "Taking it as a 'possible hypothesis' (as derivative creation applied to animals lower than man is taken for a 'probable hypothesis'), Catholics may freely work towards its establishment, by research and discussion;

(6) "If anyone chooses to make it a purely personal belief, he may."

The worst that could be said of this book is that the author's ingenuity in reconciling Genesis with theology provokes the suspicion that his contact with science has impaired that disinterested passion for truth which is characteristic of theologians. One chapter in particular (on the formation of Eve) provides evidence of a talent which would find more fitting employment in writing scientific text-books than in the austere science of theology.

ARNOLD LUNN.

NOTICES

LETTERS TO SCHOOLMASTERS. By F. W. Felkin. Sheldon Press. 4s. 6d.

Books on education have perhaps a sad reputation; they are often dull and platitudinous. Mr. Felkin's little book deserves no such reproach; it is pithy, full of detailed suggestion, based on wide experience, and bravely defiant of many of the dogmas of educational theorists. Readers of THEOLOGY will no doubt turn early in their reading to the "Letter" to the teacher of Scripture; it is an admirable example of the author's provocative vigour and common sense. The book is not meant for people without a sense of humour; no one will agree with it all, but no one who knows anything of teaching will fail to find in it most lively stimulus.

A summary is impossible; we can only recommend the book most heartily to those who are concerned with teaching, and who are prepared to think it possible that their views and practice would profit by the suggestions of a keen and versatile mind.

A. T. P. WILLIAMS
(*Headmaster of Winchester*).

THE HUMAN PARROT, AND OTHER ESSAYS. By Montgomery Belgion.
Humphrey Milford. 12s. 6d.

"I planted," says St. Paul; "Apollos watered." But there are other necessary duties. St. Paul might never have been in a position to say, "The seal of my apostleship are ye in the Lord," if there had not been someone, for example, to scare the crows away. This useful office is admirably performed by Mr. Belgion, and as his crows are all extremely intellectual, it is fitting that the derisive cries which he utters should be extremely intellectual too. And so indeed they are. His book is not easy to read, though a moderately intelligent person, being at fault, will find at the second perusal that the fault was his and not the author's. The book is a collection of eleven essays (of which eight have appeared before, though all were written to fill their appointed place in a scheme), and it contains a great deal of acute thinking. The author is not minded to set out his own positive creed, though there are indications of what it might be, if he did. His aim is rather to expose the futility of much that passes for cultured criticism. He does this in an indirect but very effective way. He wishes, for example, to demonstrate that Behaviourism is nonsense. He does it by means of a learned examination of two recent books on Anthropology. Other chapters deal with Art (Epstein, M. Maritain and his pseudo-scholasticism, literature and propaganda, the nature of criticism, "the theory that the reading of poetry can be a substitute for the holding of religious or other fundamental beliefs," Mr. Lippmann's attempt to "identify God and Mammon"), and in all these he dismisses a whole host of important and popular authorities in a way which no doubt will exasperate them very much. They will call it airy, but they will find it not easy to breathe back his careful defiance into his own gently smiling face.

Though he smiles, it is the smile of a fencer, intensely concentrated upon a momentous battle. Mr. Belgion is much concerned with morals, and he has a much closer acquaintance than most people with what is being said by contemporary teachers. From very different quarters, by the writers of certain war-books and by the Russian Government, we are assured that man is irresponsible. Mr. Belgion believes in human freedom. While Sir James Jeans appears to be deceived by the mere magnitude of the physical dimensions in which his mind ranges, Mr. Belgion takes the profounder view of the Parable of the Lost Sheep; he will not be persuaded that "a peculiar virtue resides in mere quantity." Dr. Whitehead's cosmology "does not account for moral responsibility," and whereas Whitehead condemns the conclusion of Leibniz's *Monadology* as "an audacious fudge," Mr. Belgion replies: "How much more worthy to be called fudge is Dr. Whitehead's statement about God." In all this part of the book he shows a close knowledge of Marxianism, of the facts of contemporary Russian life, and of the new philosophies of nature.

Here, then, is evidence enough that in Mr. Belgion we have an accomplished and spirited performer. He has not yet unfurled his own real banner, but he will do that next time.

S. C. CARPENTER.

THE LIFE OF LADY LUCY KNATCHBULL. By Sir Tobie Matthew. Sheed and Ward. 6s. net.

This life of a devoted woman was written nearly three hundred years ago. It is now printed from the original manuscript, with an Introduction by Dom David Knowles. There is a curious charm about this old seventeenth-century biography, which would alone make the book worth publication; it is one document the more for the historians of religion, busied as it is with much interesting material for enabling us to understand what the attitude of Roman Catholics was during the period between Elizabeth's reign and the Civil War. The book does more; it reveals much of the interior and spiritual life of Dame Lucy, and the relations of her "struggle towards God" have much in common with the well-known autobiography of St. Teresa. Lady Lucy was the first abbess of the English Benedictine monastery of women at Ghent; her biographer, himself the translator of Augustine's *Confessions*, is an interesting figure on the stage of history, as a reference to the *D.N.B.* clearly shows. To those who care nothing for the mystical element in religion this book will appear strange enough, no doubt; but those who find in that "mystical element" food for contemplation and spiritual consolation will read it with tender interest. It is full of quotations from the good nun's own record, which prove the true sanctity of her character.

E. H. BLAKENEY.

A DESCRIPTIVE CATALOGUE OF THE MANUSCRIPTS IN THE LIBRARY OF LAMBETH PALACE. Part II. By M. R. James and Claude Jenkins. Cambridge University Press. 12s. 6d.

The second part of this most important catalogue follows the first with a gratifying rapidity; 202 codices out of 1,221 have now been dealt with. Once again we notice that the provenance of a very considerable portion of the collection is the Augustinian priory of Llanthony. The entry of an "editio diligens" of the *De fide orthodoxa* of St. John of Damascus, on p. 180, might have been usefully accompanied by a reference to Chapter IV. of Father J. de Ghellinck's *La Mouvement Théologique du xii^e siècle*. This "editio diligens," we suppose, is the translation which Bp. Grossetête corrected. Another translation made for Pope Eugenius III. by a lawyer of Pisa, Burgundio by name, about the year 1148-1150, is entered under 129 on p. 207 of the Catalogue. It is a point of some importance to discover the medium by which Peter Lombard became acquainted with the teaching of St. John of Damascus.

WALTER K. FIRMINER.

THE ENGLISH BIBLE AS LITERATURE. By C. A. Dinsmore. Allen and Unwin. 7s. 6d.

The unique spirit of the translators in the supreme period of English prose makes it easier to regard the English Bible as one book, than the books of the Scriptures in the original. But Mr. Dinsmore leads us persuasively to see the unity in *them* as well; unity—for it is the expression of the soul of one people, different from all other peoples in being, as he says, "biologically religious." This people, Matthew Arnold said, "had a secret"; their secret was their devotion to a God with a purpose, and so their books become one book celebrating His purpose, which may be called "The Epic of Redemption." It is important to recognize what their secret was, for it is that which distinguishes the Bible from other literature, and uplifts the very words and literary form to its own level. It is a secret which our translators shared in a wonderful degree; hence the beauty of the Authorized Version regarded only as mere literature.

Mr. Dinsmore employs the method of comparison throughout; there are comparisons of the books of the Old Testament with the literature of Egypt and Babylonia, comparisons of the Hebraic and Hellenic ethos in history and poetry, and comparisons of the A.V. with modern attempts to improve on it. We may note that the writer recognizes the factor of the Latin cadences in A.V.

The New Testament presents new problems for the literary critic; its note is simplicity, sincerity and assured conviction. The mere critic is apt to stumble here as Mr. Murry has done, and needs the correction that Mr. Dinsmore supplies: "Mr. Murry, were you not speaking a little hastily when you said that 'the Gospels are examples of all that writing should not be'? When you made that generalization, were you all that a critic should be?"

So far as he enters into non-literary criticism, Mr. Dinsmore is conservative—Matthew is Matthew, Mark is Peter, and John is the redaction of the notes of the beloved disciple. But over and above its literary criticism, the book gives a clear account of Bible History, and the origin of the several parts of Scriptures, and opens up interesting avenues in many directions.

W. J. FERRAR.

THE THIRD SPIRITUAL ALPHABET. By Fray Francisco de Osuna. Translated from the Spanish by a Benedictine of Stanbrook. With an Introduction by Father Cuthbert, O.S.F.C., and Notes showing the influence of the book on St. Teresa. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 10s. 6d.

What is a Spiritual Alphabet? Is it a little rhyme beginning

"A is *ascesis*, to save us from sin,
B is the *blessing* we gain if we win . . ."

or the equivalent doggerel in Spanish? By no means. A Spiritual Alphabet is a treatise on the life of the soul, written in chapters each beginning with a letter of the alphabet.

A. *Anden siempre juntamente la persona y spiritu . . .*

B. *Benediciones muy fervientes . . .*

and so forth.

Students of the works of St. Teresa have long known that she was much influenced by *The Third Spiritual Alphabet* of Fray Francisco de Osuna. Professor Allison Peers has expressed the surprise which many people have felt that this author should have fallen into such neglect. During de Osuna's lifetime twenty editions of his works were published, while in the eighty years that followed his death, there appeared thirty-six editions in Spanish or Latin and five translations in Italian or German.

The Third Spiritual Alphabet was given to St. Teresa when she was a girl of twenty, and in its pages she found that which no priest had given her—namely, adequate spiritual direction. The advice of Fray Francisco “spoke to her condition”; and by following it as far as she was able, she entered upon the Mystic Way.

“I was greatly pleased with the book,” the saint wrote, “and determined to follow the way of prayer with all my might. And as the Lord had given me the gift of tears and I took pleasure in reading, I began to spend short periods of time in solitude, to go often to confession, and to enter upon that way of prayer, taking this book as my guide. For I found no master—that is, no confessor—who could understand me, although I sought for one twenty years after this time.”

Professor Peers, who devoted a section of his first volume of *Studies of the Spanish Mystics* to Osuna, is, we think, a little hard on the author of *The Spiritual Alphabets*, for, though he admires him in many ways, he finds him confused and difficult. Fray Francisco, it is true, would not have made as good a professor of psychology as St. John of the Cross or even as St. Teresa, and had he received a questionnaire about his religious experiences from an American psychologist, he would very likely have been at a loss how to fill it up. The trouble is that he writes not as one to whom spiritual life appears as an ordered pilgrimage, or as a ladder of definite steps, or as a castle with concentric rings of fortifications, or as under any form where progress can be measured and stages fixed, but rather as a garden where now one flower and now another can be admired and gathered. “Recollection” is for him the habitual state of the spiritually-minded, and “Recollection” includes many of the states of prayer which other writers have attempted to classify.

Those aspirants who find St. John of the Cross and St. Teresa, and more especially such writers as Père Poulain, altogether too definite, will be much helped by the fatherly counsels of Francisco de Osuna.

ÆLFRIDA TILLYARD.

THE FOURTH GOSPEL IN RECENT CRITICISM AND INTERPRETATION.
By Wilbert F. Howard, D.D. Sharp. 7s. 6d.

This is, indeed, a most methodical and comprehensive investigation of critical study of the Fourth Gospel. Dr. Howard must be an omnivorous reader with exceptional powers of digestion, for he sets out all manner of theories and approaches with precision, clarity and fairness, and indexes them with admirably planned appendices and an invaluable bibliography.

Yet this is not simply a bare recital and summary of the work of others. Dr. Howard is afraid neither to express judgments nor yet to

bring his painstaking examination to a conclusion. Naturally, when he does so, he throws himself open to criticism. For instance, it may be wondered whether Matthew v. 45 can legitimately be taken to show an universalistic conception of Sonship without the basis of faith and regeneration laid down in John i. 12, 13. Surely this implies no more than that obedience to and imitation of God's impartiality are essential to Sonship: not, as he suggests, that the just and unjust are alike "children of God." Similarly it is difficult to see that the Lord's Prayer, with its highly messianic and eschatological phraseology, is a "simple outpouring of the soul to God." Some of the differences found by Dr. Howard between the Synoptic and Fourth Gospels seem to melt away on closer inspection.

But it would be palpably unjust to regard this book as representing Dr. Howard's *own* contribution to this field of study. That, it is to be hoped, is yet to come. Here, however, is an earnest that when it does come it will be rich in clear and scholarly thought and judgment. In the meantime, students and scholars alike have been provided with a handbook to the Fourth Gospel which they would be foolish to be without.

NOEL DAVEY.

HIS TESTIMONY IS TRUE. By A. H. A. Simcox, B.A. With a Foreword by the Rev. Adam Fox. John Murray. 3s. 6d.

This is hardly a work to be reviewed in a journal of theological study. On the one hand the author (quite without any attempt at guile) takes the poor critic's breath away with the most daring identifications and interpretations. On the other hand he stifles his protests by ruling all critical questions out of court with a Great Confession of Faith in Dr. Westcott. There are some, I suppose, who will find matter of devotional interest and value in this extended meditation on the Fourth Gospel. I myself would find more if I could get rid of a suspicion that this sort of handling of Scripture—of which this is by no means the only modern example—is misleading, unedifying and even dangerous in the hands of uninstructed laymen. I know that in writing this I am being hard on one who has more than average insight into the great truths of the Johannine Gospel. Perhaps it is only the stilted, pseudo-archaic jargon in which they are set out that sticks in my gullet. Why on earth should St. John, even if he was the Son of Zebedee, have spoken High School Elizabethan?

NOEL DAVEY.

THE TAPROOT OF RELIGION AND ITS FRUITAGE. By Charles F. Sanders, Professor of Philosophy at Gettysburg College, U.S.A. The Macmillan Company, New York. 10s. net.

The author of this book is concerned to prove that if "civilization is to get its bearings, and if man is to move steadily towards his high destiny, religion, and the faith of religion, must be restored to its rightful place of universal interpreter of life, and master of civilization." The taproot of religion, he says, is found in the fact of personality, and the personal aspect of human nature is left unexplained without religion. He contends that the mystical apprehension of reality is as much a fact of human experience as sense perception, and that therefore religion and science are necessarily complementary one to the other. In an interesting

chapter on Mysticism he rejects the Behaviourist School of psychology, which he says "has almost lost the soul, just because the distinctly personal element cannot be treated either by the principles of physiology or biology." The great mystics he considers to have been "hunched horse-power persons, pouring into the world of time their unwonted additions of spiritual energy."

There is a good chapter on the function of the reason in "proving all things," and the author agrees with Professor Macmurray that "Tradition should be a starting-point and not a resting-place." In common with so many books from across the Atlantic the chapter on Institutional Forms of Religion is the weakest; one would like to commend to Professor Sanders' notice the chapters on the Church and Authority in Professor A. E. Taylor's recent Gifford Lectures. The concluding chapter on Faith as the Master of Civilization is a fine one, but the author does not seem to take into consideration here, or anywhere in the book, the problem of the evil will of man continually hindering the gracious purposes of God.

MARGUERITE HOWSE.

RELIGIOUS ESSAYS. By Rudolf Otto. Translated by Brian Lunn. Humphrey Milford. Oxford University Press. 7s. 6d. net.

This is frankly a collection of appendices to the well-known *Idea of the Holy*. But it contains essays which are of the first importance to the English reader. Otto's insistence on the "Numinous" as a factor of experience which demands recognition has, to a large extent, failed to make us take up the study seriously, because he seemed to make eeriness its chief characteristic. It is perhaps true to say that neither this eeriness, which Otto has investigated, nor the particular type of conversion which James studied is the characteristic of the Divine to which we are most sensitive. This is not to say that Otto is wrong, and that our aversion to the "uncanny element" is right or can be permanent. But there are other fields and other challenging facets of the Divine, and these are indicated more clearly in some of these essays. For example, the pressing problem of our failure to regard sin with the horror with which Christian writers, both in the Canon and outside it, have regarded it is dealt with in a clear and convincing manner. This is not by way of suggesting a mental formula, but by directing our attention to a field of experience of which we can see the edge at least. His statements are not satisfying, but they are disturbing, and that is what we need.

To many of us the essay on the Lord's Supper as a Numinous Fact will be of the greatest practical value. He points out with perfect justice that we must face the fact that the first title for the Eucharist was "the breaking of bread" and not "the eating of bread." The ideas connected with the latter are secondary. Yet we have directed our attention as investigators of the religious life on these. The present writer in putting together in his book (*Communion and Fellowship*) the points of experience of which we are conscious in our Eucharistic life, not simply as they appealed to him, but as they had emerged in discussion with many other people, has now to face the fact that we must push higher up the stream, since we have not reached the original source, the fountain-head, where the Divine arises. Whether we shall have to accept the unfamiliar form in which Otto presents the doctrine of the Real Presence is another matter.

What is important to those who try to see into their Communion is that we have had pointed out to us the sphere which was referred to in the terminology of sacrifice. That terminology has been, to many of us, simply tantalizing. We could not waive it aside since it obviously represented a body of indubitable experience. But it did not serve as an index or signpost to persons of our particular religious upbringing. We had not been bred in an atmosphere of religious sacrifices. And though we tried hard to reconstruct it from the Old Testament we failed. But Otto's description, starting from the basis of historic events, is one by which our minds can look intelligently on the facts before us and see how they cohere into a definite apprehension of something which we had known to be of vital importance and yet could not grasp.

It would not be fair to omit a word of praise for the excellence of the translation.

R. O. P. TAYLOR.

RELIGIOUS BEHAVIOUR. D. M. Trout. New York, The Macmillan Co. 20s.

The trouble about behaviourism in psychology is twofold. So long as it is strictly methodological, a description and analysis of overt behaviour in precise and scientific language, it tends to be little more than the physiology of integrated neuro-muscular-glandular processes. If it goes further and tries to justify its dismissal of experience as a mere epiphenomenon, it ceases again to be psychology and degenerates into dubious metaphysics. Professor Trout's discussion of religious behaviour in this massive textbook for American university students seems to us to be involved in both these troubles.

Experience is formally admitted to be "worthy of consideration," but is dismissed as epiphenomenal and inaccessible to science; faith, hope and love, taken as roughly the content of religion, are "popular designations of organismic processes as they appear to the subject," and it is only as reactions to stimuli that the psychologist, according to Dr. Trout, can handle them. And though the mechanistic materialism of radical behaviourists is rejected as not even an adequate working hypothesis, the distinction between mind and matter is scouted as superficial, and a scientific monism is erected on "the universal continuum of movement known to science." "Religious ultimates . . . are introspective indications that intra-organismic kinetic patterns are in process of completion, and that their subsidence will be an experience of satisfaction." Professor Leuba is rebuked for allowing his philosophical views to intrude into his psychology, but Professor Trout leaves us in no doubt that he himself regards "spiritistic religion," including belief in a God, as illusory.

The author's view of religion is that it consists in "all those organismic responses which are telic, well-integrated, relatively free from conflict with directly competing responses, perseverative, and more or less intensified." Accordingly, the Atheist may be as fully religious as the Theist, and it becomes a question of grave importance whether ants and chimpanzees are not also religious. The future of religion, so understood, is in no doubt. It will persist "while there are men or even sub-human animals with segmented nervous systems upon the distance receptors of which stimuli impinge."

This reminds one irresistibly of Penguin Island, but out of respect for Professor Trout's immense gravity we will content ourselves with saying

that it may be doubted whether it is satisfactory to call by the name of religion so much of the conative side of the life of man and the other fortunate possessors of segmented nervous systems. It certainly leads, in the book before us, to a very chaotic presentation of the content of religion. The author seems to think that automatic writing, the use of the ouija board, table-turning, and similar tricks are typically religious phenomena; and he has none of that understanding of Christian prayer and worship which we find, for example, in Pratt and Thouless. Indeed, most of the book is just general, physiological psychology along familiar American lines, behaviourist in tendency, written with much repetition and a lavish use of technical terms, much stronger in omnivorous "research" and the elaboration of "problems" than in discrimination and judgment. The student will find many useful suggestions in the problems for discussion which appear at the head of each chapter, and he will learn something from the book about American mass psychology at low religious levels. But the author's behaviourist limitations, his neglect of the nobler and more intelligent forms of religion, and his humourless and heavily technical style seriously reduce the value of his work.

There is a good bibliography and a useful thirty-page sketch of the history of the psychology of religion.

H. BALMFORTH.